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CHARTING THE CONTOURS OF A COPYRIGHT
REGIME OPTIMIZED FOR ENGINEERED
GENETIC CODE
CHRISTOPHER M. HOLMAN *
Abstract
There is a growing disconnect between the traditional patent-centric
approach to protecting biotechnological innovation and the emerging
intellectual property imperatives of “synthetic biology,” a promising new
manifestation of biotechnology that enables the design and construction of
artificial biological pathways, organisms or devices, as well as the redesign
of existing natural biological systems. As explained in previous articles, one
way to deal with this disconnect would be to expand the scope of
copyrightable subject matter to encompass engineered genetic sequences,
much in the way that copyright was expanded in the 1970s and 1980s to
include computer programs. The present article expands upon that work
and explores the possible contours of a copyright regime encompassing
engineered genetic code (EGC), explaining how a policy-optimized
application of existing copyright doctrine, facilitated perhaps by some
relatively conservative amendments to the Copyright Statute, could provide
synthetic biologists with a beneficial supplement to patents, while at the
same time addressing legitimate concerns that have been raised in response
to this proposal. The use of the term “EGC,” as opposed to “DNA,” is
intended to focus the attention where it rightly belongs, i.e., on the
information content encoded by a synthetic genetic sequence, and to make
clear that I am in no way proposing that naturally occurring DNA
sequences should be copyrighted. It also highlights the close analogy
between computer code and engineered DNA sequences. The article
includes a description of a recent attempt to register an engineered genetic
sequence as a copyrighted work with the U.S. Copyright Office (the
“Copyright Office” or “Office”).
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I. Introduction
Synthetic biology has been defined as “an emerging area of research that
can broadly be described as the design and construction of novel artificial
biological pathways, organisms or devices, or the redesign of existing
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natural biological systems.” 1 In essence, it is the next generation of the
biotechnology revolution that began with the development of the
foundational tools for engineering DNA, commonly referred to as genetic
engineering, in the 1970s. 2 While the earliest products of biotechnology
involved relatively simple rearrangements of naturally occurring genetic
elements, synthetic biology is characterized by much more extreme
deviations from nature. 3 Products of synthetic biology include entirely
synthetic genes and complex synthetic genetic systems that increasingly
represent works of purposeful human design and engineering rather than
mere recombinations of DNA sequences derived from nature. 4 There is
great hope that advances in synthetic biology will result in sustainable
technologies that address many of society’s most pressing concerns
regarding healthcare, nutrition, and energy. 5
If this technology is to live up to its potential, there must be adequate
incentives in place to fund the research, development, and
commercialization of synthetic biology products. As explained in a
previous article, however, there is a growing disconnect between the
traditional, patent-centric approach to protecting biotechnological invention
and the intellectual property imperatives of synthetic biology. 6 That article
suggested that one way to deal with this disconnect is to expand copyright
to encompass synthetic DNA sequences in the same way that copyright was
expanded in the 1970s and 1980s to encompass computer programs.
I have explained in another article that some forms of engineered DNA
sequences should be considered copyrightable subject matter, and indeed
that such an expansion of the recognized scope of copyright would not
require any revision of the Copyright Act. 7 In the present article, I expand
upon that work and explore the possible contours of a copyright regime that
would encompass synthetic DNA. Significantly, the present article focuses
the discussion primarily on copyright for what I will refer to as “engineered
1. Synthetic Biology 101: What Is Synthetic Biology?, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT
(citation omitted), http://www.synbioproject.org/topics/synbio101/definition/ (last visited
Aug. 8, 2016).
2. Christopher M. Holman, Developments in Synthetic Biology Are Altering the IP
Imperatives of Biotechnology, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 388-403 (2015) [hereinafter
Holman, Developments].
3. Id. at 418-41.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 442-54.
7. See generally Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2011) [hereinafter Holman, Copyright].
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genetic code” (“EGC”), rather than DNA per se. In so doing, my intent is to
focus the attention where it rightly belongs, i.e., on the information content
encoded by a synthetic genetic sequence.
This distinction between copyright for EGC and copyright for DNA is
significant and bears emphasis. Historically, any discussion of extending
copyright to biotechnology has tended to cast the debate in terms of
“copyright on DNA,” which, for a host of reasons, is loaded terminology
invoking concerns about the possibility of property rights extending to
naturally occurring genes and, indeed, the ownership of human beings
themselves. In fact, DNA is best conceptualized as a medium for storing
and conveying genetic information, analogous to a DVD on which a
copyrighted audiovisual work is recorded, or the ink and paper traditionally
used to store and convey an author’s literary expression. It is not the
physical material comprising the book, DVD, or DNA that is copyrighted,
or for that matter which provides value, but rather the information
embodied in the medium.
EGC represents a form of human-made expression that is closely
analogous to engineered computer code, and, as is the case with most
copyrighted works, EGC can be embodied in a variety of mediums. DNA is
of course one of the most important of these mediums, but there are others,
such as RNA, a related class of macromolecules that, while chemically
similar to DNA, is nonetheless physically and functionally distinct. There
are also a variety of synthetic analogues of RNA and DNA which can be
used to embody EGC and to convey its information content.
Furthermore, EGC can be represented in a variety of non-biological
media by, for example, writing the sequence down on a piece of paper or
recording it on computer-readable media. EGC embodied in such nonbiological media is entirely analogous to representations of computer code
that are directed toward a human reader rather than a machine, as printed
source code might be read from paper. Although EGC constitutes only one
aspect of biotechnology, it is an extremely important one and could be
leveraged to provide meaningful and appropriately tailored protection for a
variety of important biotechnological innovations.8
The present article explains how a policy-optimized application of
existing copyright doctrine, facilitated perhaps by some relatively
conservative amendments to the Copyright Statute, could provide a

8. See Guide to Biotechnology 2008, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG.,
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/files/BiotechGuide2008.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016)
(“DNA [is] the cornerstone of biotechnology”).
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beneficial supplement to patents, while at the same time addressing the
concerns of skeptics. Part II describes growing interest in an extension of
copyright to EGC, not only among academics, but also intellectual property
attorneys and biotechnologists. Part III describes a recent collaborative
attempt by myself, a law professor, and a leading synthetic biology
company to register an engineered genetic sequence as a copyrighted work
with the U.S. Copyright Office. Part IV explains how copyright could
provide a useful and socially desirable supplement to patent protection but
would not entirely supplant the role of patents in protecting EGC. Part V
discusses various attributes of a copyright regime that protects EGC in a
manner that advances innovation policy. Part VI, the heart of the article,
explores the manner in which existing copyright doctrine could be applied
to EGC in a manner best suited to promote public policy, which could
involve congressional action.
II. A Growing Interest in Copyright for EGC
Academics have long debated whether DNA might be considered
copyrightable, and, if so, whether such an expansion of recognized
copyrightable subject matter would constitute good policy. 9 Today,
however, there appears to be a growing interest among a more pragmatic
constituency of non-academics. 10 The earliest example of this of which I
am aware comes from a personal conversation I had with a man who served
as Chief IP Counsel at a leading gene-discovery company from 1999 to
2002. He told me that, during that timeframe, the company had considered
the human genetic sequences it was discovering to be copyrightable and
had formally attempted to register them as copyrighted works with the U.S.

9. See Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 711-14. See generally Dan L. Burk,
Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469, 531–32 (1989);
Jorge A. Goldstein, Copyrightability of Genetic Works, 2 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 138 (1984);
Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
191 (1982); Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Andrew W.
Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J. L., SCI. & TECH. 629 (2010)
[hereinafter Torrance, Synthesizing Law]; Donna Smith, Comment, Copyright Protection for
the Intellectual Property Rights to Recombinant Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal, 19 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 1083, 1096–1108 (1988).
10. See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Bioengineers Look Beyond Patents: Synthetic-biology
Company Pushes Open-source Models, 499 NATURE 16 (2013).
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Copyright Office. These attempts at registration were apparently denied,
and the company does not appear to have appealed these decisions. 11
Since the publication of my first DNA copyright article, several
companies interested in pursuing copyright in engineered DNA sequences
have contacted me. For example, an attorney representing a syntheticbiology company (which was developing synthetic microorganisms for use
in a variety of applications, such as living biosensors capable of detecting
toxins and pathogenic organisms) learned of my work and wanted to know
whether I thought copyright could be used to protect his company’s
products. He explained that the development of these products was an
iterative process, involving continual updating and revisions of the
underlying EGC, and that patent protection was a poor fit due to the cost
and long lag time between the filing of a patent application and issuance of
a patent. Trade secret was not up to the task either, since the engineered
microorganisms (which inherently incorporate the EGC) were commercial
products, and hence widely distributed to customers, much in the way
computer software code is inherently made available to customers, and thus
difficult to protect by trade secret law. This company’s predicament
contrasts with more traditional biotechnology companies, particularly those
that use bioengineering to produce drugs and are thus able to maintain
physical control over engineered organisms and their genetic code.12 This
attorney believed that copyright could play an important role in protecting
the company’s proprietary EGC. Unfortunately, I had to inform him that
copyright for EGC has yet to be recognized, and as a practical matter
probably will not be anytime soon.
Agricultural biotechnology could have the most to gain from an
extension of copyright for EGC, at least in the near term. I have spoken
with one attorney who used to work at a major agricultural biotechnology
company, and he explained that his company considered the possibility for
years. In fact, he related to me an interesting anecdote. Years ago, he was
making a presentation in India to patent examiners, explaining his
company’s position that engineered DNA and products such as seeds that
incorporate engineered DNA should be patentable. One of the patent
examiners spoke up and voiced his opinion that engineered DNA should
not be patentable, but instead should be protected by copyright.

11. See infra Part III, which describes a letter from the Copyright Office stating that our
appeal of the Office's decision to deny registration of an engineered DNA sequence was "a
matter of first impression" for the Office.
12. See Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 422-28.
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Attorneys at some of the leading intellectual property law firms in the
United States are also seriously considering the potential applicability of
copyright to EGC. I have been contacted by a number of attorneys working
at these firms who have read my work and share my views regarding the
legal and policy justifications for this extension of the scope of
copyrightable subject matter. At least one major law firm is actively
soliciting clients, looking for one that would be willing to pursue a
copyright enforcement action with respect to engineered DNA. I learned of
this through a conversation with an attorney currently working at a major
agricultural biotechnology company. This attorney shared with me a
PowerPoint presentation a law firm had recently presented at his company,
essentially explaining that the time is right for biotechnology companies to
assert their copyright in EGC by filing copyright infringement lawsuits
against unauthorized users of the company’s proprietary EGC. It seems
only a matter of time before the question of whether EGC can be
copyrighted makes its way before the courts.
In fact, one of the companies is so interested in the potential benefits of
copyright for EGC that it agreed to work with me on a test case in which we
attempted to register a synthetic, engineered DNA sequence with the U.S.
Copyright Office as a copyrighted work. 13 The company is ATUM
(formerly DNA2.0), a leading synthetic biology company headquartered in
Newark, California. 14 Much of ATUM’s business involves designing and
synthesizing EGC for its customers. 15 In most cases, the company is not
particularly interested in patenting this EGC, in part because it would be
prohibitively expensive given the large number of engineered sequences the
company is producing, particularly in view of the marginal commercial
value of many of the sequences (at least compared to the EGC used in the
manufacture of traditional biotechnology products such as drugs and seeds).
The long lag time involved in getting a patent is also a substantial deterrent
for a fast-moving company like ATUM, as is the current uncertainty
regarding the patentability of gene-based inventions in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s Myriad decision, which held that at least some synthetic
DNA sequences are patent-ineligible. 16

13. See infra Part III.
14. See ATUM, https://www.atum.bio/ (last visited May 13, 2017).
15. See id.
16. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); see
also Mayo Collaborative Servs., v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (holding
diagnostic processes applying natural law patent ineligible).
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Moreover, ATUM seeks to foster a vibrant public domain in synthetic
biology and would rather not contribute to a proliferation of patents that
could unnecessarily limit access to building blocks of future innovation in
the field. 17 The desire of a company like ATUM to avoid cluttering the
innovation landscape with an unnecessary number of patents reflects not
only the ethos of many in the synthetic biology community, but also the
very practical desire of a DNA-synthesis company to encourage freedom to
operate in this technological space.18
Much of ATUM’s business involves synthesizing DNA sequences to
fulfill customers’ orders - essentially contract manufacturing. Some
customers specify the DNA sequence to be synthesized, while others
contract with ATUM to design and synthesize a novel DNA sequence that
provides the functional attributes desired by that customer. 19 In either event,
trying to assess freedom to operate with respect to patent infringement can
be an awesome task, particularly for a relatively lean company like ATUM
that receives a multitude of orders for unique DNA sequences from a
diverse array of customers. Although patents are publicly available
documents that, in principle, provide notice to potential infringers, as a
practical matter it can be very difficult and expensive to assess whether or
not the manufacture of a synthetic sequence could result in an allegation of
patent infringement, and the difficulty increases with the complexity of the
sequence.
There are a large number of issued patents relating to DNA sequences
that would have to be considered in any thorough assessment of freedom to
operate. 20 Patent claims directed towards genetic sequences can be written
in very broad terms, encompassing astronomical numbers of variants
sharing some degree of structural and/or functional similarity. 21 Even in
cases where a third-party patent has been identified, the boundaries of
patent claims can be hard to discern, even for an attorney, rendering it
difficult at times to assess the potential for infringement liability. In many
cases it is impossible to know whether a patent claim encompasses a

17. See Ledford, supra note 10, at 17.
18. Id.
19. See ATUM, supra note 14.
20. Christopher M. Holman, Debunking the Myth That Whole-Genome Sequencing
Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 240 (2012) [hereinafter
Holman, Debunking].
21. Id.; see also Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified Version
of the Blast Score as a Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of
Related Protein Sequences, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 68 (2004).
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product without determining claim scope in the context of patent litigation.
Furthermore, many issued patents include invalid claims, but again, it is
often the case that the invalidity is only determinable in the context of
litigation or post-grant review by the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), both of which can be prohibitively time-consuming and
expensive, particularly in the context of synthetic biology.
Patents relating to genes encoding fluorescent proteins provide an
illustrative example. These genes have come to play an extremely important
role in biotechnology and are used extensively in a variety of applications
involving research and analytics. The first fluorescent proteins to be used in
this manner were the green fluorescent proteins (“GFPs”), derived from
fluorescent jellyfish. 22 The discovery of GFPs not only led to a welldeserved Nobel Prize, but also resulted in a family of patents, including
some that include ambiguously drafted claims that could be interpreted as
providing broad coverage over later-discovered fluorescent protein genes,
potentially even genes with very different structure and functional
characteristics than the originally discovered GFPs.23 These patents ended
up in the hands of a patent enforcement company, and resulted in ceaseand-desist letters and lawsuits against a number of companies using
fluorescent protein technology. 24
For a company like ATUM, the breadth of many DNA-based patents,
compounded by uncertainties regarding their scope and validity, can pose
significant problems. A narrower form of intellectual property protection,
such as might be provided under a copyright regime that recognizes EGC,
would allow an innovator to garner some protection for a useful
innovation—like an engineered fluorescent protein—without unduly
impeding the ability of others to independently develop functional analogs,
which in some cases might provide different or improved functional
characteristics.
In fact, the synthetic biologists at ATUM engineered their own novel
engineered DNA sequence encoding a fluorescent protein. This synthetic

22. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2008
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2008/press.html.
23. See Tania Bubela & Robert Cook-Deegan, Keeping Score, Strengthening Policy and
Fighting Bad Actors over Access to Research Tools, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 143
(2015); Christopher Holman, Judge Calls Anticancer Inc.’s Attempts to Enforce GFP
Patents “Misguided,” Warns That Future Enforcement Activity Could Warrant an Award of
Attorney Fees, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (June 30, 2013), http://holmansbiotechipblog.
blogspot.com/2013/06/judge-calls-anticancer-incs-attempts-to.html.
24. See Bubela & Cook-Deegan, supra note 23.
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gene, which the company has dubbed “Prancer,” achieves its fluorescence
by means of a significantly different structural mechanism than original
GFP-based proteins. 25 ATUM does not necessarily require broad patent
coverage that would preclude others from designing genes with the
functional characteristics of Prancer, but would understandably like to have
some legal mechanism to stop competitors from free-riding off its
investment in time and money. In the absence of some form of IP
protection, piracy is extremely easy with respect to EGC like the Prancer
gene, owing to the ready availability of gene synthesis machines and the
self-replicability of DNA. 26 A pirate would not even need to access a single
copy of the original DNA in order to recreate it - the mere publication of
the Prancer sequence on the Internet could be used as a basis to cheaply
make the gene, which could then be easily replicated.27
ATUM believes that, at least in certain cases, copyright protection for
synthetic genes like Prancer could provide a more appropriate form of
protection than patents. A number of commentators have argued that, from
an innovation policy perspective, copyright is the preferred form of
protection for software.28 For similar reasons, the same might be the case
25. Prancer Purple Protein, ATUM, https://www.atum.bio/eCommerce/catalog/
datasheet/41 (last visited May 12, 2017).
26. Christopher M. Holman, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.: A Bellwether for the Emerging
Issue of Patentable Self-Replicating Technologies and Inadvertent Infringement, 80 MO. L.
REV. 665, 672-73 (2015) [hereinafter Holman, A Bellwether].
27. See id. at 669-72.
28. In a recent Federal Circuit opinion, the court noted:
[S]everal commentators have recently argued [that software is or should be
entitled to protection only under copyright law—not patent law]. See
Technology Quarterly, Stalking Trolls, ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21598 321–intellectual–
property–after–being–blamed-stymying-innovation-america-vague (“[M]any
innovators have argued that the electronics and software industries would
flourish if companies trying to bring new technology (software innovations
included) to market did not have to worry about being sued for infringing
thousands of absurd patents at every turn. A perfectly adequate means of
protecting and rewarding software developers for their ingenuity has existed for
over 300 years. It is called copyright.”); Timothy B. Lee, Will the Supreme
Court save us from software patents?, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2014, 1:13 PM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/02/26/will-thesupreme-court-save-us-from-software-patents/ (“If you write a book or a song,
you can get copyright protection for it. If you invent a new pill or a better
mousetrap, you can get a patent on it. But for the last two decades, software has
had the distinction of being potentially eligible for both copyright and patent
protection. Critics say that's a mistake. They argue that the complex and
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with respect to some EGC, particularly with advances in synthetic biology
blurring the line between software engineering and genetic engineering. 29
III. Our Attempt to Register EGC as a Copyrighted Work
In the spirit of experimentation and “pushing the envelope,” Professor
Andrew Torrance (University of Kansas School of Law) and I teamed up
with ATUM in a project wherein we sought copyright registration for the
Prancer DNA sequence with the U.S. Copyright Office. 30 We did this with
the intent of advancing the public conversation regarding the potential
applicability of copyright to EGC. Although we fully expected the
Copyright Office to deny registration, we thought that by appealing such a
decision it would be possible to get the Copyright Office to explain the
basis for its position that, while computer code is copyrightable,
functionally analogous EGC is not. A denial of registration could
potentially be appealed in the federal courts, if we chose to take the matter
that far.
There is some precedent for using copyright registration to expand the
recognized scope of copyrightable subject matter. For example, in the early
1960s the Copyright Office expressed “profound doubts” as to whether
computer programs qualified as copyrightable subject matter.31 A student at
Columbia University Law School challenged the Copyright Office position
by filing for registration of a computer program the student had created. 32
In response to this and other requests for registration of computer programs,
in 1964 the Copyright Office began to permit registration of computer
programs under a “‘rule of doubt’ . . . leaving the ultimate question of
copyrightability to the courts.” 33

expensive patent system is a terrible fit for the fast-moving software industry.
And they argue that patent protection is unnecessary because software
innovators already have copyright protection available.”).
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (second alteration in
original).
29. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 421-22.
30. Christopher M. Holman, Claes Gustafsson & Andrew W. Torrance, Are Engineered
Genetic Sequences Copyrightable?: The U.S. Copyright Office Addresses a Matter of First
Impression, 35 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 103, 103-05 (2016).
31. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 692–93.
32. See William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: A Failed Experiment and
a Solution to a Dilemma, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 201-03 (2003).
33. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 692, 693.
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Judicial appeal of a Copyright Office registration denial is one means by
which the question of copyrightability of EGC could be brought before the
courts. 34 This was the route through which the copyrightability of
videogame displays, for example, was established. In that case, the
Copyright Office had repeatedly rejected Sega’s attempts to register the
videogame BREAKOUT as an audiovisual work, based on the Office’s
conclusion that “the display screens both individually and as a whole
simply lack[ ] sufficient creativity to make them registerable as audiovisual
works.” 35 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the Copyright Office had
erred by applying an overly stringent standard of creativity, pointing out
that “[t]he vast majority of works make the [copyright] grade quite
easily.” 36
Not surprisingly, our request to register Prancer was initially rejected by
the Office, with no meaningful explanation. In pursuit of a more in-depth
explanation, we submitted a request for reconsideration (the “Appeal”) on
November 26, 2012. 37 In our request, we argued that human-designed DNA
sequences such as Prancer fall comfortably within the category of “literary
work” explicitly specified as copyrightable in the statute for substantially
the same reasons that computer programs are currently treated as literary
works eligible for copyright protection. 38 Our Appeal explained that, as an
original work of authorship “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression,”
the Prancer DNA sequence appears to satisfy the various statutory
requirements of copyright, particularly given the Copyright Statute’s
expansive and flexible definition of copyrightable subject matter.39 We also
emphasized the potential policy benefits that would accompany a
recognition of copyright protection for engineered genetic code.

34. See Proline Concrete Tools, Inc. v. Dennis, No. 07CV2310-LAB AJB, 2012 WL
2886953, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2012), vacated on reconsideration, 2013 WL 12116134
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013). The other would be a copyright infringement litigation, which
could be filed even in the absence of registration, so long as the copyright owner at least
attempted registration. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
35. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 247 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991)).
37. DNA 2.0, Inc., Supplementary Document 1: Request for Reconsideration of Denial
of Copyright Registration of Prancer DNA Sequence, 35 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 113
(2016).
38. Id. at 114-15.
39. Id.
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In February 2014, after more than fourteen months had elapsed, we
received a letter from the Copyright Office responding to our request for
reconsideration (the “Denial”). 40 The Denial was signed by Robert Kasunic,
Associate Register of Copyrights and Director of Copyright Policy and
Practices, and began by apologizing for the delay in responding to our
request, explaining that “this request was an issue of first impression for the
U.S. Copyright Office and as such, was given significant consideration
prior to rendering a decision.” 41 The letter goes on to state that “after
carefully reconsidering the registration materials and the arguments
contained in your request reconsideration, the Office affirms the refusal
registration.” 42
The Denial sets forth both policy and legal rationales purporting to
support the Office’s decision to refuse registration. We could have
petitioned the Copyright Office a second time to reconsider its refusal to
register and then proceeded to challenge the decision in the courts, as Sega
did with respect to videogame displays. After reading the Denial, however,
we concluded that further appeal to the Copyright Office would almost
certainly be futile, and an appeal to the courts would require the
expenditure of more time and money than ATUM was prepared to spend at
that time.
We wrote a short article describing in greater detail the result of our
attempt to register the Prancer DNA sequence, including a detailed
response that we believe refutes the Office’s stated rationale for denying
registration. 43 Hopefully our efforts have at least helped lay the groundwork
for future discussion of the potential role of copyright in biotechnology. It
took many years for the Copyright Office to evolve from its initial position
of “profound doubt” regarding the copyrightability of software, and there is
reason to believe that history might repeat itself with respect to EGC.
IV. Copyright Would Supplement Rather Than Supplant Patent for EGC
In the Denial, the Office asserted that one reason DNA should not be
eligible for copyright is that it is already eligible for patent protection. But
the patentability of EGC should really have no bearing on the question of
copyrightability. As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently
40. DNA 2.0, Inc., Supplementary Document 2: Affirmance of Refusal for Registration,
35 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 119 (2016).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Holman, Gustafsson & Torrance, supra note 30, at 103-11.
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and unequivocally reaffirmed in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
“[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is
patentable it may not be copyrighted.”44 In Oracle, the Federal Circuit
specifically addressed the question of whether copyright and patents could
coexist in the context of software, but the same legal and policy
considerations would apply to EGC. Patent and copyright could easily play
complementary and synergistic roles in the protection of EGC, much as
they currently do with respect to software. In fact, some degree of
redundancy in intellectual property protection for such an important area of
technology is desirable, as insurance in the event that one mode of
protection ultimately proves less robust than was originally thought.
For example, consider the effect that the recent tightening of the patent
eligibility standard has had on software patents. For years, prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 45 the courts had been
loosening the standard for patent eligibility, and the PTO responded by
issuing a host of patents directed towards software inventions.46 However,
since the Court’s recent imposition of a stricter standard, particularly
through its decision in Alice v. CLS Bank, 47 we have seen a parade of
previously issued software patents invalidated for failure to satisfy the new
standard. 48 As a practical matter, the patent protection that software
innovators thought they had achieved through patents, and which was the
basis for investment in companies seeking to commercialize the technology,
is proving to have been largely illusory. Fortunately, copyright for software
remains a viable alternative, as was recently affirmed in Oracle, and
provides at least a baseline level of protection for software developers, even
as they are stripped of their patents. With respect to biotechnology, recent
tightening of the patent eligibility requirement threatens to take a similar
toll, particularly in certain areas, such as diagnostics.49

44. 750 F.3d 1339, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (citing Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)); see Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (“We do hold that the patentability of
the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art.").
45. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
46. Christopher M. Holman, The Mayo Framework Is Bad for Your Health, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 901, 904-06 (2016) [hereinafter Holman, The Mayo Framework].
47. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
48. Holman, The Mayo Framework, supra note 46, at 923-24; see also Robert R. Sachs,
The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #AliceStorm, BILSKIBLOG (June 20, 2015),
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-year-anniversary-the-aftermath-of-alice
storm.html.
49. Holman, The Mayo Framework, supra note 46, at 923-24.
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Unfortunately, because copyright has yet to be recognized for EGC,
there is no backup in the event patents are taken away. The primary
alternative form of intellectual property protection currently available for
biotechnology is trade secret and, as has been explained elsewhere, there
are substantial public policy concerns incident to shifting the emphasis of
intellectual property and biotechnology from patents to trade secrets. 50 The
availability of a viable copyright alternative for EGC could provide an
important non-trade-secret baseline of protection in the face of continuing
uncertainty with respect to the viability of patents in the context of
engineered DNA and biotechnology.
At this point in the discussion, one might ask why it is that the law has
developed in a manner such that software innovation is afforded the
benefits of both copyright and patent protection, but biotechnological
innovation is not. The answer probably has much to do with historical
context. At the time copyright was initially opened up to computer
programs, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was unclear whether patent
protection would be available for software. In fact, the Supreme Court
issued two decisions in the 1970s finding the computer programs at issue in
those cases ineligible for patent protection. 51 This was problematic from an
innovation-policy perspective, since it was widely recognized that some
form of intellectual property for software innovation would be necessary to
incentivize optimal innovation.52 With the facial similarity of a transcribed
computer program and traditional text, policymakers—and ultimately
Congress and the courts—grasped upon the fiction that a computer program
is a “literary work,” and essentially enlisted copyright to fill the apparent
intellectual property void. 53
Soon after the copyrightability of computer programs was established,
the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Diehr that some computer programs
are patent eligible, 54 and the Federal Circuit followed up with a series of
decisions espousing a quite permissive standard for the patent eligibility of
software. 55 As a result, both patents and copyright came to play substantial
and non-redundant roles in protecting innovation in this important area of
50. John M. Conley, Robert Cook-Deegan & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Myriad After
Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 597, 600 (2014).
51. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
73 (1972).
52. See Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 673-74.
53. Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 710.
54. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981).
55. Holman, The Mayo Framework, supra note 46, at 905-06.
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technology. In a like manner, synthetic biologists might choose to use
copyright as a supplement to patent protection for some aspects of their
inventions, thereby filling potential gaps in coverage that might arise when
patent is the only form of intellectual property available. Alternatively, they
might choose to rely on copyright in lieu of patent, thereby obviating some
of the policy concerns associated with the patenting of genetic sequences in
a manner that better facilitates open access and follow-on innovation. 56
Many of the advantages that flow from using copyright to protect software
would also apply to EGC, as discussed in more detail below.57
There are those who argue that EGC does not meet the statutory
requirements for copyrightability. 58 But it is important to recognize that
essentially the same arguments have long been raised with respect to
copyright for software, although in recent years it has become much less
controversial. While today it is well settled that a computer program can be
copyrighted as a “literary work,” 59 for years many experts in copyright law
bridled at the suggestion. 60 Even after the copyrightability of software was
generally accepted, courts struggled when applying judicial precedent,
which has historically focused on the protection of aesthetic works, to
functional computer programs. 61 Today, copyright protection for software
is thoroughly entrenched, and it would be extremely difficult to retreat,
particularly in view of the fact that Article 10 of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) provides that
“[c]omputer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected
as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).” 62 Nonetheless, as
pointed out by the U.S. Solicitor General in an amicus brief recently filed
with the Supreme Court recommending denial of certiorari in the case of
Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc., the Supreme Court has yet to address
56. See Ledford, supra note 10, at 17.
57. See infra Part VI.
58. Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 704-05 (collecting sources).
59. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C][2]
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
60. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 665-71; see also Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case
for Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131, 1143-44
(1986).
61. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling
a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit.”).
62. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pt. II,
§ 1, art. 10.1 (Apr. 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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the application of copyright principles to computer programs, and so the
exact contours of the protection are not entirely without ambiguity,
particularly given certain splits between the various circuits.63
In applying copyright law and legal precedent to EGC, the close analogy
between software and EGC is likely to prove invaluable. Many of the
fundamental questions regarding the scope of copyright protection available
to EGC, such as the degree of substantial similarity required to show nonliteral infringement, the proper application of the idea/expression
dichotomy, and related concepts such as merger, to name but a few, have
already been addressed in numerous judicial decisions involving computer
code. 64 These decisions often explicitly acknowledge that the traditional
doctrines are used as policy levers, and that, particularly with respect to
functional copyrighted works like software (and EGC would also fall within
this category), it is extremely important to interpret long-standing doctrine
in a manner that furthers innovation policy, recognizing that much of the
precedent originated in cases involving primarily aesthetic works that do
not implicate the same policy concerns.65
Fortunately, the law has a long and well-established tradition of using
analogy as a primary mechanism for adapting to the development of new
technologies that warrant copyright protection, and for doing so in a manner
that remains cognizant of the overriding policy objectives underlying
copyright law. Professor Nimmer has observed, for example, that
[a]s to new forms of creative expression that may emerge in the
future as a result of scientific discoveries or technological
developments . . . [i]f such a new form is sufficiently analogous
to the kinds of works that are expressly protected in the eight
63. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Google, Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2887 (2016) (No. 14-410) (Mem.), 2015 WL 2457656 at *19-*23; see also Apple
Compt., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (“We believe
that in the context before us, a program for an operating system, the line [between idea and
expression] must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in consideration 'the preservation of
the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright
laws.'”); Comput. Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We are
satisfied that the three step approach we have just outlined not only comports with, but
advances the constitutional policies underlying the Copyright Act. Since any method that
tries to distinguish idea from expression ultimately impacts on the scope of copyright
protection afforded to a particular type of work, 'the line [it draws] must be a pragmatic one,
which also keeps in consideration "the preservation of the balance between competition and
protection . . . ."’” (alteration in original) (quoting Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1253)).
64. See infra Part VI.
65. See infra Part VI.
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categories, it will be regarded as falling within “the present
congressional intent,” even though the similarity is only by
analogy. 66
Similarly, Professor Goldstein correctly observes in his treatise that
the question will sometimes arise whether a new form of
authorship, not expressly mentioned in the Act, is entitled to
protection. The most practical and principled approach to this
section is to reason by analogy to works expressly listed in
section 102. . . . [N]ew forms of works should be protected if
they are similar to those listed and not protected if they are
dissimilar. 67
V. Desired Policy Attributes of a Copyright Regime Encompassing EGC
In a 1988 article, Professor Dan Burk concluded that while EGC would
probably qualify for copyright protection, at least as a matter of legal
doctrine, such an extension should only occur if it would further public
policy objectives. 68 He opined that, at the time when he wrote that article,
which was relatively early in the biotechnology revolution, policy
considerations did not seem to support the extension of copyright protection
to genetic sequences, and for that reason he suggested that society refrain
from going down that path. 69
I agree that extending copyright to EGC should only be pursued if it
makes sense as a matter of policy, but I would argue that, in fact,
compelling policy objectives might be furthered by extending copyright to
genetic sequences, and I believe the proposal warrants serious
consideration. Of course, opinions will vary with respect to exactly what
constitutes optimal innovation policy. Some would be in favor of very
narrow and limited scope of protection, for example, whereas others would
favor more robust rights. Ideally, copyright for engineered DNA would
provide some baseline of protection that supplements and complements
patent protection, but does not supplant it, just as patent and copyright exist
side-by-side in the context of software.
The first policy issue to address concerns the manner in which copyright
should treat human genes and other naturally occurring DNA sequences. I
66.
67.
68.
69.

1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 59, § 2.03[A].
1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.6 (3d ed. 2016).
Burk, supra note 9, at 520-25.
Id.
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have found that when I initially broach the idea of copyright for EGC to
someone who has not previously given the idea much thought (most
copyright scholars, for example), the initial response is typically an
objection based on the idea that no one should be able to “own” another
person’s genes or, for that matter, genetic information in general. Indeed, a
widespread resistance to the idea of property rights in human genes and
genetic materials appears to have been a primary driver in the Supreme
Court’s decision to take the Myriad case and would likely be an obstacle in
any move to extend copyright to DNA. 70
A consensus position on optimal innovation policy would likely impose
some sort of requirement that, in order to be copyrightable, a synthetic
sequence must incorporate some non-trivial degree of variation relative to
the closest naturally occurring counterpart. Thus, for example, the
introduction of a very slight modification to a naturally occurring DNA
sequence should generally not be sufficient to render that sequence
copyrightable. In fact, some might argue that a relatively substantial degree
of difference should be required as a prerequisite to copyright protection. In
Myriad, the Supreme Court recently suggested that in order to be patenteligible a chemical compound must be “markedly different” from any
naturally occurring counterpart.71 The “markedly different” standard was
subsequently incorporated into PTO guidance on patent subject-matter
eligibility. 72
There are many dimensions in which an EGC can differ from a naturally
occurring counterpart upon which it might be based. For example, due to
the redundancy of the genetic code, a sequence encoding a native protein
can be altered at the nucleotide level to generate an EGC that still codes for
the identical protein sequence.73 From a policy perspective, a single
nucleotide alteration that results in a synonymous DNA sequence of this
sort might be considered creatively insufficient to warrant copyright
protection. On the other hand, multiple alterations, perhaps incorporated
into the sequence in order to optimize codon usage for improved expression
in a recombinant host, could be characterized as the sort of substantial and

70. See The Fight to Take Back Our Genes, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/feature/fighttake-back-our-genes (last visited May 12, 2017).
71. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117
(2013).
72. 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618,
74,622-24 (2014).
73. See generally Holman, Debunking, supra note 20.
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creative departure from nature that would warrant protection. 74
Alternatively, nucleotide alterations might be introduced that change the
amino acid sequence of the encoded protein, which could result in
functional differences ranging from subtle to extreme. 75 Possible
permutations on these ideas are virtually infinite, but suffice it to say that
optimized innovation policy might warrant the institution of a threshold for
copyrightability that requires some substantial degree of divergence from
the corresponding native sequence.
Synthetic biology encompasses not only engineered genes, but also
engineered genetic systems, including engineered recombinations of genes
and other genetic elements. 76 The individual genes and genetic elements,
which can include promoters, enhancers, and other regulators of gene
expression, can be thought of as modules. 77 Much like a software engineer
can create new software by recombining modules of code, a genetic
engineer can recombine genetic modules to achieve a desired outcome in an
engineered biological system. 78 In either case, the modules themselves
might already exist, but the creative reorganization and integration of
preexisting modules can nonetheless represent a significant feat of
engineering. Stanford University’s Christina Smolke recently reported her
laboratory’s successful creation of a synthetic twenty-three-gene, opioidsynthesis pathway in a bacteria, and with advances in synthetic biology,
even more complex synthetic genetic systems are surely on the horizon.79
The engineering of genetic modules can be quite simple - the earliest
feats of genetic engineering, for example, typically involved the
introduction of a single, cloned gene into a recombinant plasmid. 80 But with
advances in synthetic biology, the rearrangement of genetic elements is
becoming quite complex, and is resulting in synthetic biology products that
comprise a large number of interacting modules designed to achieve a
complex result. 81 The Smolke group’s introduction of a new metabolic

74. For example, this technique is used in codon optimization. See generally Natalie J.
Ward et al., Codon Optimization of Human Factor VIII cDNAs Leads to High-Level
Expression, 117 BLOOD J. 798 (2011).
75. Holman, Debunking, supra note 20, at 242.
76. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 419-22.
77. See id. at 438-39.
78. Id. at 421.
79. Stephanie Galanie et al., Complete Biosynthesis of Opioids in Yeast, 349 SCIENCE
1095 (2015).
80. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 397.
81. Id.
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pathway into an engineered microorganism is a good example. 82 Optimal
innovation policy could dictate some substantial threshold of complexity
and creativity in the reordering of existing genetic modules as a prerequisite
to copyright protection.
To the extent possible, copyright for EGC should provide the necessary
scope of coverage to incentivize innovation without unduly impeding
subsequent research and innovation by others. 83 Copyright protection that
would prevent outright pirating, i.e., the direct appropriation of the identical
DNA sequence, would be highly desirable, particularly as it is becoming
increasingly cheap and easy to generate an unlimited number of exact
copies of a DNA sequence. Replication of EGC embodied in a seed can be
particularly easy - in some cases requiring nothing more than soil, water,
and sunlight. 84 Access to engineered DNA is no longer required for
copying, since a genetic sequence published online can readily be converted
into the equivalent DNA molecule, and then used to produce additional
copies ad infinitum. 85 Furthermore, some reasonable scope of protection
would be desirable in order to deter an unscrupulous copyist from skirting
infringement by simply introducing a few minor changes to a copyrighted
DNA sequence. 86 At the same time, many would argue that the protection
should be tailored so as not to unduly preclude others from independently
creating EGC that provides substantially similar functionality.
If copyright is extended to EGC, it should be done in a manner that
minimizes the threat of liability for primarily non-commercial actors, such
as academic researchers, educators and their students, and synthetic biology
hobbyists (i.e., DIY synthetic biologists). Patent law has a very limited
exemption for research use, and this lack of an explicit safe harbor for
research is a focal point of criticism of the patent system. 87 An optimized
copyright regime for EGC might provide a relatively broad exemption for a
wide variety of research, facilitating follow-on innovation while at the same
time addressing the concerns of critics.

82. See generally Galanie et al., supra note 79 (describing process).
83. See Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 458-62; see also Heidi Williams,
Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, 121 J. POL.
ECON. 1, 24-25 (2013).
84. Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 669-70.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher M. Holman, Recent Developments
Affecting the Enforcement, Procurement, and Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299 (2008).
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In the realm of software, the open-source-software movement has
leveraged copyright protection to promote sharing and public accessibility
of software code in a manner that facilitates collaborative innovation.88 For
years there has been a significant and growing interest in developing an
open-source alternative for biotechnology. 89 Given the increasing
convergence of software design and biotechnology, particularly in the realm
of synthetic biology, it is not surprising that biotechnologists yearn for the
perceived benefits of open source. Unfortunately, although there have been
earnest attempts at open-source biotechnology, up to this point we have not
seen a truly workable model that compares with what exists for software. 90
Optimally, a copyright regime encompassing EGC would facilitate the
development of a pragmatically viable open-source alternative for
biotechnology.
Interoperability is often a critical consideration in software design and
development, and has been defined as the “[a]bility of a computer system to
run application programs from different vendors, and to interact with other
computers across local or wide-area networks regardless of their physical
architecture and operating systems.” 91 Similarly, there has been an
increasing recognition of a need for interoperability in synthetic biology. 92
A copyright regime that facilitates interoperability should be considered as
an important policy objective.
Synthetic biologists complain that patents can be prohibitively expensive
to acquire and that they can take too long to issue, particularly for a fast88. See MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS OF SOFTWARE: WHAT EVERY MANAGER,
PROGRAMMER AND ENTREPRENEUR MUST KNOW TO THRIVE AND SURVIVE IN GOOD TIMES
AND BAD 124-25 (2004); Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do
Property Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21-22 (2006).
89. Ethan R. Fitzpatrick, Open Source Synthetic Biology: Problems and Solutions, 42
SEATON HALL L. REV. 1363, 1370-78 (2013); Bryn Nelson, Cultural Divide, 509 NATURE
152, 152-53 (2014); Torrance, Synthesizing Law, supra note 9, at 653-58; see also Holman,
Developments, supra note 2, at 437-42; Ledford, supra note 10, at 16.
90. Sam Finegold, The Hard Path to Open Source Bioinnovation: How Cambia Is
Strengthening the Agricultural Open Source Infrastructure, SCI. PROGRESS (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://scienceprogress.org/2012/08/the-hard-path-to-open-source-bioinnovation/ (“[D]espite
the ambitious aspirations, BioForge was shut down after just three years. . . . The nature of
biotechnology poses additional barriers to it operating on an open-source model.”).
91. Interoperability, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/defini
tion/interoperability.html#ixzz3jNBhKdSe (last visited May 12, 2017).
92. Jorge Contreras, Arti K. Rai & Andrew W. Torrance, Intellectual Property Issues
and Synthetic Biology Standards, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 24 (2015); Kristian M.
Müller & Katja M. Arndt, Standardization in Synthetic Biology, 813 METHODS IN
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 23, 39-40 (2012).
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moving company like ATUM.93 Compounding the problem is the
uncertainty regarding the scope of patentable subject matter, exacerbated by
recent Supreme Court decisions such as Mayo and Myriad. The long-time
lag between applying for a patent and issuance of a patent was not such a
problem for the original products of biotechnology— pharmaceuticals and
genetically engineered agricultural products—because these products took
many years to bring to market, largely due to stringent regulatory
requirements. 94 With advances in synthetic biology, however, the
commercialization of new synthetic biology innovations can occur quite
rapidly, often on a time scale much shorter than the time necessary to obtain
a patent. 95 Furthermore, the exploding number of engineered genetic
sequences being developed is rendering it prohibitively expensive to seek
patent protection for each one individually. 96 The democratization of
synthetic biology, including the DIY-synthetic-biology movement, will
likely contribute to a demand for intellectual property protection that is
easier and less expensive to obtain than patent protection, and copyright
could be particularly advantageous in this regard.97 Thus, an optimal
copyright regime will provide a much quicker, less expensive, and easier
form of intellectual property relative to patents.
It would also be desirable to have a form of intellectual property
available for engineered DNA that would promote early public disclosure.
Because of the time and money necessary to file for a patent and the
problems associated with public disclosure prior to securing patent
protection, the patent regime fosters an environment that can incentivize
inventors to delay disclosure. 98 The recent heightening of the requirements
of patent eligibility and the attendant uncertainty as to whether patent
protection will be available for many gene-based inventions are reportedly
pushing some companies toward maintaining genetic sequence information
as a trade secret. 99 A copyright regime that provides a reasonable baseline
level of protection at an early stage could promote more public disclosure,
which many would see as a desired policy objective.
Ideally, copyright for EGC would provide effective protection not only
for the code itself, but also for the commercial products utilizing the EGC.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 445-46; Ledford, supra note 10, at 16.
Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 445-46.
Id. at 425, 445.
Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 444-47
Conley, Cook-Deegan & Lázaro-Muñoz, supra note 50, 599-600.
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First and foremost, an effective copyright regime would provide the ability
to protect genetically modified seeds. So far, patents have proven
reasonably effective in protecting the genetically modified crops developed
by companies such as Monsanto and DuPont, but there are significant
limitations in the effectiveness of using patents in this regard. 100 Genetically
engineered seeds raise concerns about misappropriation and free-riding
similar to those raised by software and digitally recorded music, in that it is
extremely easy for end-users of these technologies to reproduce and
distribute a virtually unlimited number of identical copies.101 In the case of
software and digitally recorded music, reproduction and distribution occurs
on the computer and over the Internet, whereas with respect to agriculture it
occurs in a farmer’s fields, but the underlying policy concerns are the same.
While today genetically modified seeds are the form of biotechnological
innovation with the most problematic potential for replication by end-users,
in the future, a host of other non-agricultural synthetic biology products
will, in all likelihood, raise similar concerns. 102 Thus, it is important that
any copyright regime that develops for EGC can be effectively leveraged to
protect self-replicating synthetic biology products from misappropriation,
including, but not limited to, seeds.
The practical enforceability of copyright will likewise be an important
consideration. A copyright regime encompassing EGC will optimally be
structured in a manner that renders enforcement against infringers more
efficient and/or provides more effective remedies.
Ideally, copyright for EGC will avoid the problem of potential
inadvertent infringement, an issue that came to the forefront a few years
ago when the Supreme Court decided Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 103 The
defendant, Vernon Bowman, was a farmer who argued that sale of a
patented seed should exhaust all patent rights in second-generation seeds. 104
Supporters of Bowman argued that without patent exhaustion, farmers
faced the threat of virtually unavoidable liability for inadvertent
infringement caused, for example, by second-generation seeds blown from
another field or purchased from a seed vendor.105 The Supreme Court
rejected Bowman’s argument in this particular case, finding that Bowman’s
100. See generally Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26 (discussing patent protection for
genetically modified seeds).
101. Id. at 669-670, 674, 678.
102. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 451-53.
103. 133 S. Ct. 1761, 2768-69 (2013).
104. Id. at 1766.
105. See id. at 1768-69; Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 684-86.
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actions were knowing and purposeful and thus the antithesis of
inadvertent. 106 The Court did recognize, however, that inadvertent
infringement could constitute a substantial policy concerns, and it left the
door open to address those concerns in a later case presenting such facts. 107
The potential for inadvertent infringement is a general concern with respect
to many DNA-based inventions, such as recombinant seeds, and a copyright
regime for EGC would optimally be structured in a manner that would
shield truly inadvertent infringers from liability. 108
Many would also argue that copyright should provide some form of safe
harbor from liability for certain entities involved in the production of
engineered DNA. For example, companies such as ATUM that provide
DNA synthesis as a service for customers are currently not in a good
position to confirm whether a sequence ordered by a customer could
potentially result in charges of patent infringement. 109 Similarly, non-profits
like Biobricks are hesitant to provide DNA components to commercial
entities for fear of patent infringement liability. 110 Ideally, a copyright
regime for engineered DNA would be structured such that it facilitates
relatively painless freedom-to-operate clearance, and/or provides some
form of protection from liability for third-party contractors and other
intermediaries with respect to which an imposition of liability would create
public policy concerns.
Finally, one of the arguments that is most often raised against extending
copyright to EGC is the duration of the copyright term. Many would argue
that the patent term is already too long, at least for the purposes of synthetic
biology, and worry about creating a new form of intellectual property
protection that lasts much longer than a patent. If these concerns regarding
the long duration of copyright could be addressed, it seems likely that much
of the opposition to the use of copyright in biotechnology would dissipate.
VI. Applying Copyright Doctrine to EGC as a Policy Lever
Ideally, copyright should treat EGC in a manner that provides the
optimal degree of protection while preventing overprotection that could
effectively tie up the building blocks of future innovation. This Part VI
considers how some of the established features of copyright law could be
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769.
See id.
See Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 697-716.
See supra Part II.
See Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 447-49.
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interpreted and applied as policy levers to achieve some of the desired
policy objectives outlined above.
A. Copyright Duration
In a previous article, I explained that many of the arguments raised
against copyright for EGC are based on fundamental misunderstandings of
copyright law and/or the nature of EGC. 111 One of the objections that I have
heard voiced repeatedly, however, is legitimate: Copyright simply lasts too
long - sometimes more than a century, depending on factors such as
lifespan of the author. 112 There are those who believe that even the much
shorter patent term is too long for biotechnology and that the last thing we
need is a thicket of copyrights constraining the freedom of operation for
future generations of synthetic biologists. One might also argue that the
long duration of copyright is gratuitous and not necessary to incentivize the
creation of new EGCs.
My response to this concern is three-fold. First, I agree that the duration
of copyright is probably longer than necessary for EGC (and also, by the
way, for computer programs for much the same reasons), and it might make
sense for Congress to consider enacting a subject-matter-specific reduction
in duration for copyright covering EGC or even copyright in general.
Second, short of reducing the copyright term, Congress could, and probably
should, consider statutory reforms that would address some of the
underlying concerns associated with the duration of the copyright term.
Third, and perhaps most crucial, it is important to recognize that the long
copyright term is already in force with respect to computer software and
does not appear to have created substantial impediments to follow-on
innovation in that technological space. There is no reason to think it will be
any more problematic in the context of EGC.
1. Reduction of Copyright Duration
Although some argue that the current copyright term is too long and
should be reduced, as a practical matter this seems unlikely, at least in the
near term, in part because of international treaty obligations.113 A subject111. Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 722, 730.
112. Ledford, supra note 10, at 17 (noting that Stanford Professor Drew Endy “worries
about the duration of copyright protections, which can last up to 120 years; patents, by
contrast, expire after 20”).
113. TRIPS provides that “[c]omputer programs, whether in source or object code, shall
be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).” TRIPS, supra note 62, at
pt. II, § 1, art. 10.1.
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matter-specific reduction in copyright term, however, might be more
feasible and worth consideration. There would be some precedent for this
approach. Many countries already afford a shorter term of protection to
sound recordings, and it has been suggested that the United States should
adopt a similar approach. 114 The Copyright Statute provides sui generis
forms of copyright-like protection for semiconductor chips and boat hulls,
and the duration of these protections is only ten years.115 Along similar
lines, Congress has also considered copyright-like protection for fashion
designs, which would have a very short duration, but this protection has yet
to be enacted. 116
Thus, it would not be entirely out of the question to address the duration
concern by congressional action, either by specifically shortening the
duration of copyright for EGC or, perhaps, by creating sui generis
copyright-like protection for EGC. At least one commentator has advocated
for an extension of sui generis copyright-like protection to EGC (as well as
software and nanotechnology). 117 If a sui generis approach is taken, it could
provide more flexibility to address other concerns that have been expressed
with regard to extending copyright to engineered DNA. Any sui generis
protection should ideally incorporate the beneficial features of copyright as
identified in this article. The duration of protection for EGC should be
tailored to meet the needs of the synthetic biology community and likely
would be substantially longer than the short period that is being
contemplated for fashion design, for example.

114. Tim Brooks, Only in America: The Unique Status of Sound Recordings Under U.S.
Copyright Law and How It Threatens Our Audio Heritage, 27 AM. MUSIC 125, 128 (2009)
(“All countries except the United States recognize that recordings are derivative works and
accord them shorter terms of protection than for the music or text they embody.”).
115. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 § 302, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (2012);
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act § 502, 17 U.S.C. § 1301-32 (2012) (boat hull designs
receive protection upon registration with the Copyright Office with the protection lasting for
ten years after registration).
116. The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009), and the
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010),
would have provided three years of protection for fashion designs.
117. See Dennis S. Karjala, Protecting Innovation in Computer Software, Biotechnology,
and Nanotechnology 31 (Mar. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress.
com/dennis_karjala/4 (arguing that sui generis, copyright-like protection would be better
suited to software, biotechnology, and nanotechnology than copyright).
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2. Statutory Reforms Addressing Underlying Concerns
Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute in a manner that renders
the long duration of copyright less objectionable. For example, some
commentators have suggested that the long duration of copyright
exacerbates the so-called “orphan works” problem, but there are avenues
for attenuating these concerns that do not require any modification of the
copyright term. 118 A group calling itself the Copyright Principles Project
(“CPP”) recently suggested that problems associated with the long duration
of copyright could be addressed by re-formalizing copyright law, and in
particular by creating stronger incentives for copyright registration, thereby
making it easier for follow-on creators to identify the owners of
copyrighted works and to seek permission to use the work. 119 The CPP’s
proposed incentives for registration include ideas such as providing broader
scope of fair use for unregistered works, denying protection against nonliteral copying to unregistered works (while maintaining the right for the
owner of an unregistered work to sue for literal copying), and broader
exemptions for non-commercial use of an unregistered work. 120 These
proposals could be adopted for copyright law in general or more
specifically for EGC in order to address concerns associated with this
proposed new category of copyrighted work.
The CPP also proposed expanding the use of private registry regimes to
better enable follow-on creators to identify and seek licenses from rights
owners. 121 The private registries envisioned by the CPP, which would be
analogous to existing rights management organizations such as ASCAP,
BMI, and the Copyright Clearance Center, could go a long way in
addressing concerns associated with long duration of copyright. 122 A private
registry could be particularly helpful in the case of EGC, because although
the Copyright Office currently has no expertise in biotechnology or genetic

118. David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 12 (2013). “Orphan works” are works with respect to which the
rights holder cannot be located even after a reasonably diligent search. Chris Castle & Amy
E. Mitchell, Orphan Works Legislation, 71 TEX. B.J. 744, 745 (2008)
119. Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform,
25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1199 (2010). The CPP describes itself as comprised of
twenty people having “various kinds of expertise and experience with copyright law and
policy. . . . [including] law professors, lawyers from private practice, and lawyers for
copyright industry firms.” Id. at 1176.
120. Id. at 1201.
121. Id. at 1203-05.
122. Id.
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sequences, there are a variety of private firms that have advanced
capabilities for cataloging and searching genetic sequences. 123 Other
governmental agencies, such as the PTO, which has years of experience
dealing with property rights in genetic sequences, might also assist in
registration and providing public notice of the existence of copyright in a
particular EGC sequence. As the CPP noted, commercial databases
operated by private entities such as Corbis and Getty have been established
to facilitate rights clearance in the context of photographs, 124 and private
prophylactics against orphan-work problems in the context of EGC would
no doubt arise once there is sufficient demand.
The Copyright Office issued a report recommending that Congress
address orphan works by providing a defense for those who, after diligent
search, are unable to identify the owner of a work and who then proceed to
incorporate that work into their own. 125 If Congress were to adopt such an
approach, it could mitigate much of the potential negative impact of EGC
copyright on follow-on innovation.
The CCP also suggested that Congress create a statutory provision that
would facilitate the ability of authors to dedicate their works to the public
domain. 126 This could be a particularly attractive option for EGC. In fact, it
could become the norm for academic researchers, and many companies,
such as ATUM, would likely find that it makes commercial sense to
dedicate at least some of their EGC to the public domain. Publicly funded
institutions, such as the National Institutes of Health, could even make this
a requirement for funding or treat it as a favorable factor when considering
approval of a grant application.
3. Copyright Generally Creates Narrower Rights Than Patent
When people voice concern about the long duration of copyright and
worry about the effect of EGC copyright on subsequent innovation, they
often seem to be equating copyright with the much broader rights
associated with patents. For a variety of reasons, copyright is a much
narrower form of protection with much less potential to negatively impact
follow-on innovation. This probably goes a long way in explaining why the
123. See, e.g., GQ LIFE SCI., https://www.gqlifesciences.com/(last visited May 12, 2017).
124. Samuelson et al., supra note 119, at 1203; see also Rights and Clearance Services,
GETTYIMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/resources/rights-and-clearance-services (last
visited May 12, 2017).
125. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 95-96 (2006), http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
126. Samuelson et al., supra note 119, at 1227.
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long copyright term has not proven particularly problematic with respect to
follow-on innovation in software. As discussed later in this article, for
example, copyright should not prevent others from designing alternative
EGC to carry out identical functions.127 To help alleviate concerns,
independent creation should never constitute copyright infringement, and
naturally occurring DNA sequences and EGC that is substantially similar to
naturally occurring DNA sequences should not be copyrightable. 128
Furthermore, the legal availability of fair use and other limitations on
copyright similarly should ameliorate many of the objections premised
upon the long duration of copyright. 129
B. The Requirements of Copyrightability
Extending copyright to EGC does not imply that all EGC would be
copyrighted. There are a variety of requirements of copyrightability that
would preclude copyright protection for a subset of EGC; genetic sequences
that too closely resemble naturally occurring genetic sequences, for
example, may be excluded. These requirements of copyrightability could be
interpreted and applied in the context of EGC in a manner designed to
further public policy. As explained in this Part VI, the courts have
repeatedly interpreted the doctrines of copyrightability in the context of
software in a manner designed to achieve certain policy objectives
associated with software innovation and, given the close analogy between
EGC and computer code, these decisions could provide useful precedent in
charting the course for a policy-driven interpretation of copyright doctrine
in the context of EGC.
1. The Originality Threshold
As set forth by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Services Co., the threshold requirement for copyrightability is
“originality.” 130 In order to meet the threshold, a work must have been
“independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works)” and must “possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.” 131
Both prongs of the Feist test could provide meaningful restrictions on the
scope of copyright protection available to EGC, requiring a certain degree

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See infra Section VI.C.2.
See infra Section VI.B.4.
See infra Section VI.C.5.
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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of creativity and effectively excluding sequences that come too close to a
naturally occurring genetic sequence.
Of particular relevance in the context of DNA, the independent-creation
requirement could be leveraged to effectively preclude copyright protection
for any DNA sequence derived from a natural source. As discussed above,
many of the objections raised with respect to extending copyright to DNA
have focused on concerns that it would create property rights over human
genes and other naturally occurring genetic material.132 A strictly construed
requirement of originality would address these concerns.
On the other hand, EGC should often be found to satisfy an independentcreation test, perhaps even in cases where it is quite similar to a naturally
occurring genetic sequence. The Supreme Court recognized the creativity of
genetic engineering in Myriad, noting that the “lab technician
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA [“synthetically created”
DNA] is made.” 133 The fact that a synthetic biologist uses information
about a naturally occurring sequence as the raw material in the creation of
an original engineered genetic sequence should no more be a bar to
copyright protection than would be the incorporation of knowledge gleaned
from the natural world into a computer program. For that matter, a book
based on historical facts can be copyrighted, even though the historical facts
themselves were not created by the author. Likewise, a sculptor does not
forfeit copyright protection by using naturally occurring wood or stone as
his starting material. It makes little sense to suggest that a work cannot
receive copyright protection simply because it is based to some extent on a
product of nature, so long as it meets the modicum-of-creativity standard
required under Feist.
The modicum-of-creativity prong of the Feist test 134 could draw the line
between unprotectable natural sequences and copyrightable engineered
sequences and thereby serve as a policy lever to further innovation policy.
For example, it could be used to set a certain minimal requirement of
divergence from nature by requiring as a prerequisite for copyright that an
engineered DNA sequence incorporate a substantial departure from any
corresponding natural sequence. This would mirror the PTO’s current
standard for patent eligibility of DNA sequences dictated by Myriad,
pursuant to which a DNA sequence must be “markedly different” from a

132. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
133. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119
(2013).
134. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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naturally occurring counterpart in order to constitute patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 135
In fact, the extent to which EGC must diverge from nature in order to
satisfy the modicum-of-creativity standard could actually be higher than the
standard for patent eligibility set forth in Myriad. In Myriad, the Court held
that BRCA cDNA is different enough from its natural counterpart to be
patent-eligible, in spite of the fact that a cDNA sequence is extremely
similar in both function and structure to the mRNA molecule on which it is
based. 136 The cDNA embodies the same information as the corresponding
mRNA, and there is really no creativity, at least in the literal sense,
involved in converting naturally occurring mRNA into cDNA. 137 In my
view, cDNA would generally not satisfy the originality requirement of
copyright, even though the Supreme Court has deemed it patentable.
The requirement of creativity has, on occasion, been invoked to deny
copyright protection to conventional literary works, creating precedent for
courts to take an analogous approach when faced with an insufficiently
creative EGC. In Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Service, for
example, a “common legal form” was declared uncopyrightable, based on
the court’s finding that “[t]he plaintiff did no original legal research which
resulted in a significant addition to the standard conventional sales contract
or chattel mortgage forms; he merely made trivial word changes by
combining various forms and servilely imitating the already stereotyped
language found therein.” 138 In contrast, courts have found more elaborate
blank forms evidencing greater creativity to meet the threshold.139 In Edwin
K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, for example, the court
found the relatively more complex forms at issue in that case “constituted
an integrated work entitled to copyright protection.” 140 Similarly, in
Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., the court found an “Executive
Planner” copyrightable as a compilation, distinguishing earlier cases that
had found similar products uncopyrightable because “[n]one of the works
135. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117, 2119.
136. Id. at 2116; see Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professor Christopher M. Holman in
Support of Neither Party, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 WL 2884112, at *9-*12
[hereinafter Holman Amici Brief].
137. Holman Amici Brief, supra note 136, at *9.
138. 426 F.2d 1027, 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970); see also Donald v. Uarco Bus. Forms,
344 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Ark. 1972), aff’d, 478 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1973).
139. See Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053
(9th Cir. 1976); Baldwin Cooke Co. V. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
140. Edwin K. Williams & Co., 542 F.2d at 1061.
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involved in those cases approached sophistication and complexity of format
and arrangement involved here.” 141
As a general matter, the recombination of naturally occurring DNA
sequences should be found to constitute a work deserving of copyright
protection, but the requirement of creativity could be leveraged to ensure
that a copyrightable design reflects some threshold level of creativity. For
example, a very straightforward and routine operation—like splicing a
commonly used promoter with a protein-encoding gene sequence—should
probably be considered insufficiently creative to meet the standard.
It is well established that copyrightable expression can arise solely from
the creative selection and arrangement of otherwise uncopyrightable
elements. For example, in Feist, the Supreme Court held that the selection
and arrangement of facts can be copyrightable, so long as the selection and
arrangement evidences the necessary modicum of creativity. 142
Analogously, a creative selection and arrangement of naturally occurring
genetic sequences in an engineered construct should be sufficient to warrant
copyright protection for the construct. Significantly, the protection would
not extend to the underlying facts, i.e., the naturally occurring sequence
elements, and the selection and arrangement of the components would have
to satisfy some minimal threshold of creativity. 143
On the other hand, an insufficiently creative selection and arrangement
of naturally occurring genetic sequences should be found to lack the
necessary modicum of creativity to receive protection. Note, however, that
the amount of creativity required under Feist has generally been interpreted
as minimal 144 and, if the same standard is applied to EGC, many works
involving the selection and arrangement of preexisting genetic elements
would be deemed copyrightable, given the large and growing number of
genetic sequences available for recombination. For example, a cDNA
sequence corresponding exactly to a naturally occurring mRNA probably
lacks the necessary creativity, but incorporating that cDNA sequence into a
plasmid would probably involve sufficient creativity of expression, given
that there are a large number of plasmids from which to choose and
different locations and orientations in which the cDNA could be introduced
into the plasmid. In the context of software, a novel arrangement of

141. Baldwin Cooke Co., 383 F. Supp. at 650.
142. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991).
143. Id.
144. See N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109,
119-20 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring).
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modules providing structure for a software program has been found to
satisfy the creativity standard for originality. 145
Of course, courts could ratchet up the modicum-of-creativity standard for
EGC in furtherance of innovation policy.
One might argue that since the design of EGC is informed and guided in
large part by the cumulative knowledge of the relationship between
biological sequence and function, gleaned from observation of naturally
occurring genetic sequences, these engineered sequences should generally
fail the modicum-of-creativity test. But many works currently recognized as
copyrightable, such as books describing natural phenomena or computer
software incorporating fundamental principles of math and science, are
based in part upon the observation of the natural world and naturally
occurring phenomena, yet no one seriously suggests that the incorporation
of this sort of knowledge renders the product uncopyrightable. Engineered
genetic sequences are products of the design and intent of the creator, and
the fact that starting materials and design principles are based in large part
on the observation of naturally occurring sequences should not, as a general
matter, render these products of creativity uncopyrightable.
The principle that copyright is not necessarily precluded for creative
works that are based upon, or even highly similar to, uncopyrightable works
of nature is illustrated by a recent district court decision overturning a
Copyright Office decision to deny registration of “rock and stone sculptures
that are used to make decorative concrete stamps.” 146 The Office’s decision
that these man-made sculptures are not copyrightable was based on its
improper conclusion that the sculptures were mere “slavish copies of
uncopyrightable objects and, as such, do not contain a sufficient amount of
original authorship to support copyright claims.” 147 In particular, the Office
“opined that the works are slavish copies because they just replicate natural
stones and their features.” 148 Although no one would dispute that naturally
occurring stones and rocks are not copyrightable, the court pointed out that
the sculptures at issue in this case “are not molds of existing stones or

145. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1982); see also
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
146. See Proline Concrete Tools, Inc. v. Dennis, No. 07CV2310-LAB AJB, 2012 WL
2886953, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2012), vacated on reconsideration, 2013 WL 12116134
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013). This decision was later vacated on procedural grounds. See
Proline Concrete Tools, Inc. v. Dennis, No. 07CV2310-LAB AJB, 2013 WL 12116134, at
*6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013).
147. Proline, No. 07CV2310-LAB AJB, 2012 WL 2886953, at *2 (citation omitted).
148. Id.
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rocks. They are created from the artists [sic] interpretation of stones and
rocks he has observed.” 149 The court criticized the Office’s decision not to
register the stone sculptures, noting that it seemed “to result from its
confusion over how [the registrant] creates the sculptures and what exactly
it seeks to copyright.” 150
For essentially the same reason, the Copyright Office’s current position
that EGC is not copyrightable because it is based on naturally occurring
genetic sequences suggests that the Copyright Office is confused as to this
distinction between naturally occurring genetic code and engineered genetic
code. Perhaps the only relevant difference between EGC and the sculptures
in Proline is that the question of copyright for EGC has yet to make it to the
courts.
Some judicial opinions seem to suggest that a heightened requirement of
creativity exists with respect to derivative works, as compared to truly
original works. 151 A recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., is particularly on point.152 In
Home Legend, an alleged copyright infringer brought an action against the
copyright owner seeking a declaratory judgment that its copyright for a
laminate-flooring design was invalid because the flooring design was
nothing more than a “slavish copy of nature.” 153 The court rejected this
argument for reasons similar to those of the court in Proline, holding that
the flooring design was not a slavish copy of nature, but rather the
expression of a sufficiently creative idea to be protectable by copyright. 154
The court did, however, go on to characterize the flooring design as a
derivative work, given that its design “reflects the uncopyrightable features
of each plank—features like the shape of the natural underlying wood grain
and the plank's shape, both of which are in the public domain.” 155 As a
derivative work, the court held that the laminated flooring design was
149. Id. (citation omitted).
150. Id. at *3.
151. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). But see
Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Gracen said that
‘a derivative work must be substantially different from the underlying work to be
copyrightable.’ This statement should not be understood to require a heightened standard of
originality for copyright in a derivative work.” (internal citation omitted)).
152. 784 F.3d 1404, 1414 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data
Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1515 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A creative work is entitled to the most
protection, followed by a derivative work, and finally by a compilation.”)).
153. Id. at 1410.
154. Id. at 1414.
155. Id.
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eligible for only relatively narrow copyright protection, limited to “identical
and near-identical copies.” 156
Similarly, an engineered DNA sequence that is based on a naturally
occurring DNA sequence could be plausibly characterized as derivative of
the native sequence and, hence, potentially subject to a heightened
requirement of creativity. Even if this requirement is satisfied, derivation
from a naturally occurring sequence could result in narrow coverage limited
to identical or near-identical sequences. This approach could serve a policy
objective of increasing the minimum creativity threshold for engineered
DNA, thereby excluding from copyright protection DNA sequences lacking
some requisite degree of creativity and providing only narrow protection for
minimally creative sequences. On the other hand, the more EGC departs
from nature and other public domain genetic sequences, the more it should
be afforded the more robust protection generally available for copyrighted
works.
2. Fixation in a Tangible Medium
Unlike patent protection, which must be specifically applied for and
granted by the PTO, copyright comes into existence at the time of fixation
in a tangible medium of expression. 157 This low barrier to protection could
provide a number of policy benefits. For example, it would greatly reduce
the cost, effort, and time associated with securing intellectual property
protection for EGC and associated biotechnological products, such as
recombinant seeds. The Report of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) specifically
recognized this as one of the benefits of extending copyright protection to
software, predicting that, because copyright exists from the moment a work
is fixed, “copyright is likely to be increasingly important in protecting
computer programs, particularly those of small entrepreneurs who create
their works for individual consumers and can neither afford or properly use
other forms of protection.” 158
156. Id.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
158. NATIONAL COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT at 15 (1978) [hereinafter “CONTU Report”]. Congress established CONTU in the
1970s to study and make recommendations as to how the copyright law should respond to
various technological developments, most notably the increasing significance of computer
programs. See id. at 1. The commission was specifically directed to consider and make
recommendations with respect to the question of whether, and to what extent, computer
programs could be protected under current copyright law and whether copyright law should
be amended to accommodate computer programs. See id. CONTU issued its highly
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The ease with which the requirement of fixation is satisfied could
encourage early disclosure of newly created engineered genetic sequences.
When the developer of a biotechnology product based on EGC relies on
trade secret and patents, there is an incentive to maintain the secrecy of the
code, at least until a patent application is filed. But because copyright vests
as soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium 159 - which could be in written
form or embodied in a DNA molecule - it becomes less necessary to
maintain secrecy or to secure confidentiality agreements and contractual
restrictions or to file a patent application in order to secure some proprietary
position. Again, the CONTU Report specifically identified this as one of
the benefits of copyright for computer programs, noting that copyright
protection reduces the cost associated with maintaining secrecy, and that it
also promotes public dissemination.160
C. Limitations on Infringement Liability
A number of the established doctrines pertaining to copyright
infringement could be interpreted in a manner that promotes innovation in
EGC and synthetic biology in general, while at the same time addresses
attendant policy concerns. Again, precedent gleaned from software
copyright cases could prove extremely valuable in shaping the contours of
infringement liability for EGC.
1. The Requirement of Actual Copying
Infringement of copyright’s reproduction right requires proof of actual
copying. 161 As a corollary, independent creation of a copyrighted work does
not constitute copyright infringement, even if the two works are identical. 162
This fundamental feature of copyright law has important policy
implications and should alleviate many of the concerns raised with respect
to extension of copyright to DNA. For example, some might question
whether copyright on an EGC might inadvertently cover a naturally
occurring DNA molecule that happens to share the same sequence. But if
someone came up with a synthetic sequence and it turned out that the

influential Final Report in 1978, which concluded not only that copyright protection for
computer programs was justified both in terms of legal doctrine and innovation policy but
that computer programs in fact already were copyrightable under both the 1976 and 1909
Copyright Acts. Id. at 16-17.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
160. Id. at 17.
161. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
162. Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2002).
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sequence actually already existed in nature, it would not constitute
infringement for someone else to subsequently discover the naturally
occurring version. Furthermore, anyone seeking to use that DNA sequence
could do so without infringing, because they would be copying from the
natural sequence rather than from the copyrighted synthetic one, regardless
of whether or not the synthetic sequence was copyrighted before the
discovery of the natural one.
Copyright is particularly suited to policing against unauthorized literal
copying. In the context of software, literal copying typically equates with
piracy, i.e., the illicit reproduction of exact copies of a software product.
EGC is likewise particularly vulnerable to piracy, especially when it is
made widely available to consumers in a self-replicable format, such as a
seed. 163 Copyright law’s prohibition against literal copying could prove
very useful in preventing piracy of engineered DNA products. In the case of
a complex piece of EGC, proving literal infringement should be
straightforward, and in many instances, copyright would likely be much
easier to enforce than patent rights.
There are important limitations, however, even in the context of literal
infringement. Literal copying is not infringement, for example, if the
copying is limited to the ideas of a work, as discussed below. 164 On the
other hand, copyright has a number of advantages over patents in terms of
enforceability, such as civil forfeiture provisions, 165 impoundment, 166
criminal sanctions, 167 and provisions for enlisting the aid of the U.S
Customs Service in blocking the importation of pirated copies.168
2. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The protection afforded by copyright does not “extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 169 Section 102(b) codifies this
longstanding common-law principle known as the “idea-expression

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 670.
See infra Section VI.C.2.
18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012).
17 id. § 503.
Id. § 506; 18 id. § 2319.
19 C.F.R. § 133.31 (2016).
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
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dichotomy.” 170 The prohibition against copyrighting ideas, methods of
operation, and the like has often been invoked as a policy lever to limit the
scope of copyright protection with respect to software.171 Similarly, it could
serve as a useful lever to regulate and limit the scope of protection available
for engineered DNA.
For example, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., the
court explained “that in the context before us, a program for an operating
system, the line [between idea and expression] must be a pragmatic one,
which also keeps in consideration ‘the preservation of the balance between
competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.’” 172
The court found that the focus of the issue of copyrightability must be on
whether the underlying idea is capable of alternate modes of expression. 173
As applied to operating system software, the court found that “[i]f other
programs can be written or created which perform the same function as
Apple’s operating system program, then that program is an expression of
the idea and hence copyrightable.” 174 The same rationale should apply to
EGC: EGC is copyrightable if, and only if, alternative non-copyrighted
EGC can be designed which performs the same function.
When courts first began applying the idea-expression dichotomy to
software, they struggled with the incongruity between software and
traditionally copyrightable material.175 Unlike traditional copyrightable
subject matter, software tends to be primarily functional, lacking readily
identifiable aesthetic elements (at least to a lay observer).176 Fortunately,
the numerous judicial decisions involving copyright protection for software
issued over the last four decades provide a useful roadmap as to how to go
about incorporating similar limitations with respect to EGC, facilitated by
the close analogy between EGC and computer code.177

170. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670.
171. See infra Section VI.C.2.
172. 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citing SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Comput. Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829 (M.D. Tenn.
1985)) (“The essentially utilitarian nature of a computer program further complicates the
task of distilling its idea from its expression.”).
176. Id.
177. See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 59, § 13.03.
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The idea-expression dichotomy has been invoked in the context of
software as a doctrinal tool for limiting the scope of protection in a manner
that does not tie up software function, but instead extends only the
particular code used to achieve that function and relatively close variants
thereof. 178 This modern manifestation of the dichotomy has resulted in a
copyright regime that leaves open the ability of others to engineer computer
programs that achieve the same functionality, while still creating a basis for
liability in the case of piracy and direct copying. Importantly, although
patents have been granted that broadly cover software-implemented
algorithms and which are not limited to any specific code used to achieve
that implementation, under well-established principles of copyright law, the
algorithm itself cannot be copyrighted, only the specific code used to
implement it (and in some cases involving non-literal infringement,
relatively close variants). 179 Today, the courts routinely invalidate software
patent claims of this type, invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice,
and revealing that the scope of protection provided by these patents was
largely illusory. 180 Although the protection provided by copyright is
substantially narrower, it has been much less controversial and shows no
signs of being undercut in the manner that patent protection has been.
The idea-expression dichotomy could be enlisted as a policy lever to
limit the scope of protection available for EGC as compared to other
copyrighted works. Feist suggests that factual works will often receive only
relatively “thin protection.” 181 Based on this aspect of Feist, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has, for example, found only thin protection
for maps, essentially limiting the protection to original selection and
arrangement of expressive elements. 182 Analogous reasoning could support
similarly narrow protection for EGC.
Delineating the boundary between idea and expression is far from an
exact science, as aptly noted by Judge Learned Hand:
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident
is left out. . . . [T]here is a point in this series of abstractions
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
[copyright owner] could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.; see also Altai, 982 F.2d at 714.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219-20 (1981).
See Sachs, supra note 48.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1998).
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apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody
ever can. 183
But it is this very ambiguity that courts have leveraged in applying the
idea-expression dichotomy in a manner designed to promote innovation
policy in the context of software, and which could likewise be enlisted to
meter the scope of protection available to engineered DNA. Depending
upon where a court draws the boundary between idea and expression, which
as Judge Learned Hand notes is open to considerable judgment and
discretion, non-literal copying can constitute either infringing appropriation
of expression or non-infringing use of an uncopyrightable idea.
An example of this principle at work arose in the case of Kregos v.
Associated Press, where judges of a Second Circuit panel came to opposite
conclusions on a question of non-literal infringement, based on the level of
abstraction at which the idea of the copyrighted work was defined.184 The
copyrighted work was a “baseball pitching form” providing various
statistics “concerning the past performances of the opposing pitchers
scheduled to start each day’s baseball games.” 185 The two-judge majority
sided with the district court and defined the idea of the work as “to publish
in outcome predictive pitching form.” 186 Since there are multiple ways of
expressing this idea, according to these judges, copyright protection was
available for the plaintiff’s specific selection of statistics. In contrast, the
dissenting judge contended that the plaintiff’s idea is that “the nine statistics
he has selected are the most significant ones to consider when attempting to
predict the outcome of a baseball game. Unquestionably, if that is the idea
for purposes of merger analysis, the merger of that idea and its expression
has occurred - by definition.” 187 This judge would have denied plaintiff any
scope of protection. By analogy, the same analysis could be used to justify
either thin protection, or no protection at all, for an ECG, depending on the
policy leanings of a judge deciding the matter.
a) Merger Doctrine
The merger doctrine is a manifestation of the idea-expression dichotomy
that could be applied to meter the scope of copyright protection available
183. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (internal
citations omitted).
184. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
185. Id. at 702.
186. Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
187. Id.
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for EGC. Under the merger doctrine, if an idea “can only be expressed in a
limited number of ways,” those means of expression “cannot be protected,
lest one author own the idea itself.” 188 Under such circumstances, the idea
and its expression are considered “merged.” 189 For example, if, within a
given technological environment, computer code must be drafted in a
specific way in order to instruct the computer to carry out a particular
function, then the expression “merges” with the function, rendering the
code uncopyrightable.
In Altai, for example, the court began by describing the line between idea
and expression as a pragmatic one, particularly in the case of software,
which courts should delineate on the basis of policy. 190 Applying this
principle, the court concluded that software features “dictated by
considerations of efficiency” are not protectable, since “the more efficient a
set of modules are, the more closely they approximate the idea or process
embodied in that particular aspect of the program’s structure.” 191 Altai
noted that
[w]hile, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in
which a programmer may effectuate certain functions within a
program,-- i.e., express the idea embodied in a given subroutine - efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of
choice as to make only one or two forms of expression workable
options. 192
On the other hand, the court recognized that “[o]f course, not all program
structure is informed by efficiency concerns.” 193 Based on these
considerations, the court concluded that
in order to determine whether the merger doctrine precludes
copyright protection to an aspect of a program’s structure that is
so oriented, a court must inquire “whether the use of this
particular set of modules is necessary efficiently to implement
that part of the program’s process” being implemented. If the
answer is yes, then the expression represented by the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2014).
See id. at 103.
Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 708.
Id.
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programmer’s choice of a specific module or group of modules
has merged with their underlying idea and is unprotected. 194
Similarly, if there are only a few ways of expressing a given idea, the
available scope of protection can be extremely narrow. For example, in a
recent case involving a photographer who took photos of a vodka
manufacturer’s blue vodka bottle and then sued the vodka manufacture for
using someone else’s photographs in its advertisements, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that this “litigation is fundamentally
about how many ways one can create an advertising photograph . . . of a
blue vodka bottle. We conclude there are not very many.” 195 Because of the
limited number of ways of expressing the idea, the court held that only
“virtually identical copy” would be actionable. 196 Similarly, in a case where
there are limited ways of achieving the function of a given EGC, that
sequence might be afforded extremely narrow scope of protection.
As a corollary, the fact that two software programs both use the same
efficient means of accomplishing some function is not necessarily probative
of copying. 197
The Federal Circuit recently addressed merger in the context of software
in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc. 198 The court began by noting that, as
applied to computer programs, the merger doctrine “means that when
specific [parts of the code], even though previously copyrighted, are the
only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by
another will not amount to infringement.” 199 At the same time, the court
observed, the “unique arrangement of computer program expression . . .
does not merge with the process so long as alternate expressions are
available.” 200 With respect to the software at issue in the case, merger did
not apply because “[t]he evidence showed that Oracle had ‘unlimited
options as to the selection and arrangement of the 7000 lines Google
copied.’” 201 The Federal Circuit pointed out that the district court had
194. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or
Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of
Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 902-03 (1990)).
195. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2003).
196. Id.
197. Altai, 982 F.2d at 709.
198. 750 F.3d 1339, 1358-62 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
199. Id. at 1360 (alteration in original) (quoting Altai, 982 F.2d at 708).
200. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975
F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
201. Id. at 1361 (citation omitted).
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“erred in focusing its merger analysis on the options available to Google at
the time of copying. It is well established that copyrightability and the
scope of protectable activity are to be evaluated at the time of creation, not
at the time of infringement.” 202
Many of the policy-driven applications of the merger doctrine to
software could be readily extended to EGC. For example, the sequence of a
cDNA molecule corresponds exactly to a naturally occurring mRNA from
which it is derived, and could be denied copyright protection under the
merger doctrine, based on the rationale that there is only one way to express
that particular idea. Even if there are many ways of achieving the same
outcome, such as encoding a specific protein, if only a very limited number
of those alternatives are the most efficient, then under principles of merger
those most efficient might be ineligible for copyright protection. This could
be the case, for example, when a particular optimized codon sequence is
deemed necessary for the most efficient expression of a protein.
b) Scènes-à-faire
As recently observed by the Second Circuit, “the doctrine of ‘scènes-àfaire’ teaches that elements of a work that are ‘indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of a given topic’—like cowboys, bank robbers,
and shootouts in stories of the American West—get no protection.” 203 In
Altai, the court applied the scènes-à-faire doctrine to deny copyright
protection to elements of a computer program “dictated by external
factors.” 204 The court cited Professor Nimmer for the proposition that “in
many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform
particular functions in a specific computing environment without
employing standard techniques.” 205 The court found this to be the
result of the fact that a programmer’s freedom of design choice
is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the
mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular
program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of
other programs with which a program is designed to operate in
conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4)
202. Id.
203. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added) (internal citation omitted).
204. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992)
(emphasis omitted).
205. Id. (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[F][3], at 13-65 (1991) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 1991 ED.]).
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demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted
programming practices within the computer industry. 206
The court concluded that, in assessing the copyright protection of software,
the court must “examine the structural content of [the] allegedly
[infringing] program for elements that might [be] dictated by external
factors.” 207 Those elements will not receive copyright protection. 208
The Altai court also found that elements of a computer program taken
from the public domain are not protectable, but are instead free for the
taking by the general public, regardless of whether it might be included in
an otherwise copyrighted work. 209 With respect to software, the court found
that this precluded, for example, copyright for program elements that might
have “entered the public domain by virtue of freely accessible program
exchanges and the like.” 210 Generally speaking, some computer routines
may be so standard in the programming industry that the scènes-à-faire
doctrine deprives them of copyright protection.
In Oracle, the Federal Circuit noted that “[i]n the computer context, ‘the
scenes a faire doctrine denies protection to program elements that are
dictated by external factors such as “the mechanical specifications of the
computer on which a particular program is intended to run” or “widely
accepted programming practices within the computer industry.”’” 211 The
court noted that the scènes-à-faire doctrine, like merger, is a component of
the infringement analysis, and as such “the expression is not excluded from
copyright protection; it is just that certain copying is forgiven as a necessary
incident of any expression of the underlying idea.” 212
Like merger, the scenes a faire doctrine, as it has developed with respect
to software, could be readily applied to EGC. Certain genetic elements
might be considered so standard that they would be denied copyright
protection, even if incorporated into an otherwise copyrightable genetic
sequence. Furthermore, genetic elements and motifs dictated by external
206. Id. at 709-10 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 1991 ED., supra note 205, at 13-66-71).
207. Id. at 710.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis
added) (quoting Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc'ns Inc., 118 F.3d, 955 (2d Cir.
1997)).
212. Id. at 1364 (citing Satava v. Lowery, 323 F.3d 805, 810 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The
Ninth Circuit treats scenes a faire as a defense to infringement rather than as a barrier to
copyrightability.”)).
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considerations, derived from the public domain, or routinely found in EGC
could likewise be excluded from copyright under a policy-driven
interpretation of the scenes a faire doctrine.
3. Non-Literal Copyright Infringement
It is well established that copyright extends not only to the literal aspects
(i.e., the actual text) of an original literary work, but also to its non-literal
aspects, such as the plot of a novel - at least to the extent those non-literal
aspects are original. 213 As Judge Learned Hand observed, “[i]t is of course
essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right cannot be
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations.” 214 “Thus, where ‘the fundamental essence or structure of one
work is duplicated in another,’ courts have found copyright
infringement.” 215 In Altai, the Second Circuit reasoned that “if the nonliteral structures of literary works are protected by copyright; and if
computer programs are literary works, as we are told by the legislature;
then the non-literal structures of computer programs are protected by
copyright.” 216 Similarly, in Oracle, the Federal Circuit endorsed Ninth
Circuit case law recognizing that the structure, sequence, and organization
of a computer program is eligible for copyright protection where it qualifies
as an expression of an idea, rather than the idea itself.217
Just as the Altai court relied on analogy to other literary works, the
analogy between engineered DNA and software supports the idea that nonliteral protection should be available for EGC. But as noted in Altai, the
recognition of the existence of non-literal protection does not end that
analysis. The court must still “determine the scope of copyright protection
that extends to a computer program’s non-literal structure,” and, thus,
courts can use this doctrine as a policy lever to adjust the scope of
protection for EGC. 218
213. See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d
Cir. 1993).
214. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
215. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 1991 ED., supra note 205, § 13.03 [A][1]).
216. Id. at 702 (internal citation omitted) (citing Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986) (“By analogy to other literary works, it would
appear that the copyrights of computer programs can be infringed even absent copying of the
literal elements of the program.”)).
217. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1366 (citing Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys.,
Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989)).
218. Altai, 982 F.2d at 703.
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Altai emphasized that, in distinguishing idea from expression, the court
should emphasize “practical considerations” rather than relying “too
heavily on metaphysical distinctions.” 219 The court based this policy on the
functional characteristics of computer programs as compared to other more
traditional copyrightable works. 220 This focus on practical considerations
should also apply to EGC.
Another important characteristic shared by software and EGC is that
both typically embody a modular structure and, as such, are readily
susceptible to representation at different levels of abstraction.221 At a low
level of abstraction, software is, of course, described by its code. All but the
most simple computer programs, however, comprise structured
arrangements of modules, e.g., subroutines and parameter lists, which are
better represented by a more abstract organizational structure or
flowchart. 222 The modules can themselves often be broken down into more
basic subroutines and other more fundamental elements, a description of
which would result in a somewhat less abstract representation of the
software, somewhere between a high level flow chart and literal code.223
The modular nature of software facilitates the design of complex software
programs, since an engineer working at a higher level of abstraction can
focus on the selection and arrangement of modules without concerning
herself with the specific code underlying those modules.224 The modular
nature of software has led courts to conceptualize software at varying levels
of abstraction and to establish that non-literal copyright infringement can
exist in cases where the structure of module arrangements has been copied,
even in the absence of literal copying of the code.225
As described in a previous article, synthetic biologists are increasingly
conceptualizing engineered genetic sequences at different levels of
abstraction and taking advantage of the modular nature of genes and genetic
control elements to facilitate design of increasingly complex synthetic DNA
sequences. 226 Not only does the complexity and modular nature of the
information content of engineered genetic sequences support an extension
of copyright to protect them, it also suggests that protection against non219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 706.
Id.
Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 424.
Altai, 982 F.2d at 697-98.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 424.
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literal copying of higher-order structures might be appropriate. Software
copyright cases could provide useful precedent for cases involving these
more complex EGCs where the court applied an abstraction test like those
described below and where the court considered issues of non-literal
copying.
The standard test for non-literal infringement centers around a search for
“substantial similarity.” 227 In order to determine whether an allegedly
infringing work is substantially similar to a copyrighted work, courts have
traditionally applied an “ordinary observer” test. 228 However, in Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found the ordinary observer test unsuited for assessing substantial
similarity in the context of copyrighted computer software.229 In view of the
complexity of computer software and the general public's unfamiliarity with
the subject, the court held that it made little sense to expect an ordinary
juror to make the determination.230 Instead, the proper audience for
assessing substantial similarity of computer programs is one skilled in the
technology of computer programming. 231 For the same reason, an
assessment of substantial similarity of engineered genetic sequences should
be made by one skilled in molecular biology.
Oracle illustrates the potential for relatively broad non-literal protection
of computer code. In Oracle, the court applied fundamental principles of
copyright law to assess infringement, such as evaluating the originality and
creativity of the software and considering whether there were alternative
ways to implement similar functions, ultimately concluding that Google had
non-literally infringed Oracle’s copyright in its software.232 The court
repeatedly rejected Google’s arguments premised on the alleged functional
and utilitarian nature of Oracle’s software.233 The court also rejected

227. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
228. Id. at 713 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)).
229. 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986).
230. Id. at 1247.
231. Id. at 1232.
232. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he SSO
is original and creative, and . . . could have been written and organized in any number of
ways and still have achieved the same functions.”).
233. Id. at 1379-80 (“Many of Google’s arguments, and those of some amici, appear
premised on the belief that copyright is not the correct legal ground upon which to protect
intellectual property rights to software programs; they opine that patent protection for such
programs, with its insistence on non-obviousness, and shorter terms of protection, might be
more applicable, and sufficient.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss3/2

2017]

THE CONTOURS OF A COPYRIGHT REGIME

447

Google’s assertion that there should be no overlap between the scope of
protection conferred by patent and copyright. 234
In Oracle, the Federal Circuit applied the “abstraction-filtrationcomparison” test in assessing whether the non-literal elements of Oracle’s
computer program constituted protectable expression, noting that the test
addresses the utilitarian nature of computer programs. 235 The court noted
that this test was formulated by the Second Circuit, endorsed by the Ninth
Circuit, and has been expressly adopted by several other circuits.236 In
applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the court analyzes the
work at different levels of abstraction and then filters out unprotectable
elements, even if those elements are expressive.237 If the court determines
that any expression, at any level of abstraction, “is dictated by
considerations of efficiency, required by factors already external to the
program itself, or taken from the public domain,” that expression is to be
treated as unprotectable and not considered in the assessment for non-literal
similarity. 238 A modified version of this test could likewise be fashioned for
EGC to achieve a scope of non-literal protection appropriate from the
perspective of innovation policy.
4. De minimis Copying
The judge-made doctrine of de minimis copying might also shield some
forms of benign, or even socially useful, copying of EGC from
infringement liability. In Davis v. The Gap, Inc., the Second Circuit
provided the following explanation of the de minimis doctrine, as well as its
policy underpinning:
Trivial copying is a significant part of modern life. Most honest
citizens in the modern world frequently engage, without
hesitation, in trivial copying that, but for the de minimis doctrine,
would technically constitute a violation of law. We do not
hesitate to make a photocopy of a letter from a friend to show
another friend, or other favorite cartoon to post on the
234. Id. at 1380 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)) (“Importantly for our
purposes, the Supreme Court has made clear that ‘[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any
other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted.’”).
235. Id. at 1358.
236. Id. at 1357 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th
Cir.1992) (“In our view, in light of the essentially utilitarian nature of computer programs,
the Second Circuit's approach is an appropriate one.”).
237. Id. at 1357-58.
238. Id.
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refrigerator. Parents in Central Park photograph their children
perched on Josè de Creeft’s Alice in Wonderland sculpture. We
record television programs aired while we are out, so as to watch
them at a more convenient hour. Waiters at a restaurant sing
“Happy Birthday” at a patron’s table. When we do such things, it
is not that we are breaking the law but unlikely to be sued given
the high cost of litigation. Because of the de minimis doctrine, in
trivial instances of copying, we are in fact not breaking the
law. 239
Application of this doctrine might particularly be useful in shielding DIY
synthetic biologists and other non-commercial actors from liability. There is
an overlap between the de minimis defense and fair use, a critically
important aspect of copyright law to which I will now turn.
5. Fair Use
The doctrine of fair use originated in the courts and was codified by
Congress in 1976. 240 In essence, it permits certain otherwise infringing uses
of a copyrighted work when enforcing a copyright would “stifle the very
creativity which [copyright] law is designed to foster.” 241 Fair use helps to
resolve “the inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect
copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it.” 242 It has been
characterized as an “equitable rule of reason.” 243
Fair use could play an important role in facilitating certain socially
desirable uses of copyrighted EGC. For example, courts have held that
“where there is good reason for studying or examining the unprotected
aspects of a computer program, disassembly for purposes of such study or
examination constitutes fair use.” 244 Thus, it is often possible for a
competitor to deconstruct a copyrighted computer program to understand its
functionality and then use that knowledge to write software that achieves
the same functionality by means of different code without incurring liability
239. Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted); cf. Tim
Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM J.L. & ARTS. 617 (2008).
240. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576
(1994).
241. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
242. Id. at 575 (citation omitted).
243. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 n.3 (1985)
(citations omitted) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 448 (1984)).
244. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993).
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for infringement. Copying of protected elements within copyrighted
software is permissible fair use if such copying is reasonably necessary in
order to access unprotected elements.245
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit
found that copying of Sega’s software in the course of disassembling the
object code embedded in the game software would ordinarily constitute
infringement, but in this case was fair use.246 “[W]here disassembly is the
only way to gain access to ideas and functional elements embodied in a
copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for
seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a
matter of law.” 247 Similarly, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo Inc., the
Federal Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit controlling law, said that Atari
could make fair use of the Nintendo program to derive unprotected ideas
and processes. 248 The court also indicated that Atari could incorporate into
its games aspects of the Nintendo program necessary to unlock the
Nintendo console. 249
Applying the same principle to copyrighted EGC, one should be allowed
to copy and manipulate engineered DNA sequences in order to understand
unprotected aspects, such as functional attributes of the engineered
sequence, without obtaining authorization from the copyright owner. This
contrasts with patent law, with respect to which there is no fair use doctrine,
and only a minimal (at best) experimental use exception. 250
Fair use is also enlisted as a doctrinal tool to address interoperability and
lock-in concerns. 251 For example, in Atari, the court indicated that Atari
could incorporate into its games various aspects of the Nintendo program
necessary to unlock the Nintendo console. 252 With respect to EGC, fair use
could be invoked in a similar manner as a means for addressing analogous
concerns.
A work’s publication status can be a significant consideration in the fair
use analysis: in general, unpublished works are afforded more protection

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1527-28.
248. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
249. Id.; see also Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000).
250. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
251. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 544-45
(6th Cir. 2004); Sony Comput., 203 F.3d at 602-05; Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
252. Atari, 975 F.2d at 844; see also Sony Comput., 203 F.3d at 596.
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than published works. 253 The contours of what constitutes “publication”
with respect to EGC would no doubt need to be worked out by the courts,
but there could be some policy benefit to providing heightened protection
for EGC in cases in which the creator seeks to limit disclosure, relative to a
situation where the copyright owner more purposefully disseminates the
DNA sequence information.
One of the ideas suggested by the CPP group is for the Copyright Office
to “provide fair use ‘opinion letters.’” 254 CPP has also suggested that
market failures, which render it difficult to obtain clearance, should be
considered a factor in fair use. 255 These suggestions could find particular
applicability in the context of EGC.
6. Inadvertent Infringement
The potential for inadvertent infringement of EGC-based patents has
been much discussed, and similar concerns would no doubt arise with
respect to copyright on EGC, given that copyright infringement has often
been characterized as a matter of strict liability. 256 Particularly when
dictated by considerations of policy, however, courts have required a
showing of at least some element of volition or causation for a finding of
infringement. 257 For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc., the district court refused to impose
direct liability on an Internet service provider, reasoning that “[a]lthough
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant system is merely
used to create a copy by a third party.” 258 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has endorsed Netcom, noting that
to establish direct liability under . . . the Act, something more
must be shown that mere ownership of a machine used by others

253. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985) (“The
Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the unpublished nature of the work to figure
prominently in fair use analysis.”).
254. Samuelson et al., supra note 119, at 1206.
255. Id. at 1226.
256. Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 305, 312 (2015).
257. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2512 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“'The Networks’ claim is governed by a simple but profoundly important rule: A defendant
may be held directly liable only if it has engaged in volitional conduct that violates the
Act.”).
258. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing conduct
with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying
that one could conclude that the machine owner himself
trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.259
In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit
recently cited CoStar Group with approval, “reject[ing] the contention that
‘the Netcom decision was driven by expedience and that its holding is
inconsistent with the established law of copyright,’ and [finding Netcom] ‘a
particularly rational interpretation of § 106,’ rather than a special-purpose
rule applicable only to ISPs.” 260 The Second Circuit found that the district
court improperly “pigeon-holed the conclusions reached in Netcom and its
progeny as ‘premised on the unique attributes of the Internet.’” 261 To the
contrary, the Second Circuit held that
[w]hile the Netcom court was plainly concerned with a theory of
direct liability that would effectively ‘hold the entire Internet
liable’ for the conduct of a single user, its reasoning and
conclusions, consistent with the precedents of this court and the
Supreme Court, and with the text of the Copyright Act,
transcend the Internet. 262
The court further held that “[w]hen there is a dispute as to the author of an
allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct
our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.”263
The rationale underlying these decisions apply in the context of EGC to
shield parties from accusations of direct copyright infringement in the
absence of sufficient evidence of volitional conduct. For example, a
farmer’s field could be analogized to the “machine” mentioned in CoStar
Group, and by analogy, mere ownership of the farmland is not sufficient to
create liability if copyrighted seeds are found growing in the field without
authorization. Instead, in order to prevail, a copyright owner would be
required to prove some volitional conduct “with a nexus sufficiently close
and causal to the illegal copying.” 264

259. CoStar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
260. 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting CoStar Grp., 373 F.3d at 549, 551).
261. Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
262. Id. (internal citations omitted).
263. Id.
264. CoStar Grp., 373 F.3d at 550.
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Congress might also consider creating statutory safe-harbor provisions to
protect certain entities that, as a practical matter, would find it difficult, if
not impossible, to avoid unintentionally indirectly infringing copyright in
EGC. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) created safe
harbors for Internet service providers (“ISPs”), 265 and similar rights could
be appropriate for entities such as DNA synthesis companies like ATUM,
firms such as Biobricks Foundation that provide modular EGCs to synthetic
biologists, 266 or perhaps even research institutions that work with large
numbers of engineered sequences. With respect to engineered seeds and
agriculture, safe harbors could be made available to grain elevator
operators, seed banks, and other “gatekeepers.”
Just as the DMCA requires ISPs to take a number of positive steps
towards avoiding infringement in order to qualify for the safeguard and
provides that ISPs must comply with “standard technical measures”
employed by rights owners to identify and block infringement, 267 there
should be a requirement that, in order to benefit from an EGC-specific safe
harbor, a firm must adopt and cooperate with technical measures designed
to detect and counter infringement. The CPP has noted that since the
enactment of the DMCA
technologies have become much better at recognizing and
filtering out infringing copies of works available on or being
distributed via the Internet[, and most] of this technology has
been developed by small entrepreneurs who see a potential
market for the technology among service providers and content
companies. The technology is increasingly “smart,” that is,
capable of determining, for example, how much of a copyrighted
movie is contained in a given online file and even whether the
file combines video or audio tracks from the movie with new
material.268
In a similar manner, the creation of a DMCA-like safe harbor regime for
EGC copyright could incentivize the development of technologies that
could be used to quickly and efficiently identify copyrighted EGC. This
would leverage the ability of firms such as these to serve as “gatekeepers,”
265. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); see, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19,
26-28 (2d Cir. 2012).
266. See The BioBrick® Public Agreement (BPA), BIOBRICKS FOUND., https://biobricks.
org/bpa/ (last visited May 12, 2017).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i); Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27.
268. Samuelson et al., supra note 119, at 1217.
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with the benefit of shifting enforcement activities away from individual
users of EGC. 269
D. Subject Matter-Specific Statutory Limitations, Exemptions, and
Compulsory Licenses
Although there are a few subject matter-specific exceptions or limitations
in patent law and none relating specifically to ECG, they are quite common
in the Copyright Statute. For example, section 106(4) omits sound
recordings from the list of works whose copyright holders have a general
right of public performance; 270 sections 114 and 115 provide compulsory
licenses for certain uses of sound recordings; 271 sections 111 and 118 create
compulsory licenses for secondary transmissions of broadcast programming
by cable systems and for public broadcasting, respectively; 272 section 117
provides exemptions from liability for certain otherwise-infringing uses of
copyrighted software; 273 and section 104 creates exemptions for various
acts of technical infringement involving teaching, private homes, and public
performance without commercial advantage.274
In a similar manner, Congress could create subject matter-specific
limitations with respect to the availability and/or enforceability of copyright
on EGC. For example, exemptions could be crafted for certain socially
desirable activities, such as teaching or noncommercial use. Compulsory
licensing could be considered as a means for addressing concerns about
transaction costs or collective-action concerns and would likely incentivize
more efficient private-sector solutions analogous to BMI, ASCAP, and the
Copyright Clearance Center.275 The fact that there is much greater
precedent for such alternatives in copyright compared to the patent statute
269. Id.
270. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
271. Id. §§ 114-15. The Section 115 Reform Act of 2006, H.R.5553, 109th Cong., would
have created a blanket license for digital music providers in order to provide legitimate
digital music services with an efficient way “to clear all the rights they need to make large
numbers of musical works quickly available by an ever-evolving number of digital means
while ensuring that the copyright holders are fairly compensated.” Discussion Draft of the
Section 115 Reform Act (SIRA) of 2006: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 58 (2006)
(statement of the U.S. Copyright Office).
272. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 118.
273. Id. § 117.
274. Id. § 104. See generally BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33631,
COPYRIGHT LICENSING IN MUSIC DISTRIBUTION, REPRODUCTION, AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE
(2015).
275. Samuelson et al., supra note 119, at 1202.
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could be seen as an advantage of enlisting copyright as an alternative form
of protection for EGC.
For example, consider 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), which provides that
[the] exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to
duplicate . . . . The exclusive right of the owner of a copyright in
a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to
the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds
fixed in the sound recording are . . . altered in sequence or
quality. The exclusive rights of the [copyright] owner [under
either clause] do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording. 276
As explained by Patry on Copyright:
As a result [of 114(b)], where a sound recording is re-recorded
using either the same or different musicians, no infringement of
the sound recording results since the actual sounds of the
original are not duplicated. This is also the case where some, but
not all, of the original musicians who performed on the first
sound recording are replaced on the new sound recording, and
the replacement musicians copy as closely as possible (or in the
case of the derivative right, adapt) the original musician's
performance. 277
One could imagine analogous restrictions on EGC copyright, which would
limit infringement to copies of DNA whose origin can be traced directly
back to the copyrighted EGC. Significantly, this would limit infringement
to someone who directly produces copies of copyrighted EGC, such as a
farmer who saves and replants seeds bearing copyrighted DNA. On the
other hand, it would provide an exemption from liability for someone who
actually goes to the trouble of synthesizing the DNA de novo, even if that
individual had access to the copyrighted sequence and sought to emulate it,
or even to reproduce it identically. Although this approach might result in
copyright for EGC that is too easy to circumvent, thus providing an
inadequate incentive for innovators, it does illustrate the fact that Congress
276. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
277. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY
Sept. 2016).
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has at its disposal a variety of methods for limiting the scope of copyright
protection for EGC if it decides that doing so would further good public
policy.
E. Remedies
Remedies could be another lever for addressing some of the policy
concerns that have been expressed regarding the potential for copyright on
EGC to adversely affect follow-on innovation. Particularly since eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the courts have recognized that, once liability is
found, an injunction is not always the appropriate remedy. 278 In cases where
a copyrighted EGC is incorporated into a larger genetic work, for example,
the appropriate remedy might be some sort of reasonable royalty that
permits continued use of the copyrighted work. 279 The CPP found that
“[a]lternative relief may also be appropriate in cases where there is a
collective action problem or a market failure due to high transaction costs
which leads to a difficulty in clearing all of the rights necessary from a
multitude of copyright owners.” 280
F. Open-Source Licensing
In the context of software, open source is well established, and best
practices are already in place. 281 Many of these practices, along with
experiential knowledge that has been generated in connection with the
open-source movement, could be adapted for use in the context of
biotechnology and EGC. In addition, the courts are developing a body of
case law that provides guidance as to how to effectively use copyright to
promote open source. In Jacobsen v. Katzer, for example, the Federal
Circuit upheld the enforceability of an open-source copyright license, 282 a
move seen by many as validating and supporting the open-source
movement, at least in the context of copyright.283 While this precedent is
arising primarily in the context of software, it should facilitate accelerated
adoption of open source as a viable alternative for biotechnology. Patents,
278. 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
279. Id. at 392-93.
280. Samuelson et al., supra note 119, at 1226.
281. Greg DeKoenigsberg & Michael DeHaan, Community at the Speed of Light: Best
Practices for the New Era of Open Source, OPENSOURCE.COM (Sept. 2014), https://open
source.com/business/14/9/community-best-practices-new-era-open-source.
282. 535 F.3d 1373, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
283. See generally Jennifer Buchanan O'Neill & Christopher J. Gaspar, What Can
Decisions by European Courts Teach Us About the Future of Open-Source Litigation in the
United States, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 437 (2010).
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on the other hand, seem less suited to serve as the foundation for a wellfunctioning, open-source biotechnology movement. 284
VII. Conclusion
Although extending copyright to EGC would raise plausible policy
concerns, it should be possible to effectively ameliorate them by
interpreting, and if necessary limiting, copyright law in a manner that
promotes innovation. This has often been the case in the past when
copyright law has extended to new subject matter, such as sound
recordings, which are afforded much narrower rights than other
copyrightable materials, and software, which has also been limited for
technology-specific policy reasons. The potential positive benefits of
extending copyright to EGC should be seriously considered, and if they are
found substantial, as I believe they are, it only makes sense to move toward
a copyright regime that accommodates genetic sequences, including any
necessary safeguards and restrictions, rather than holding to the current
status quo that denies them copyright protection altogether.

284. Sara Boettiger & Dan L. Burk, Open Source Patenting, 1 J. INT’L BIOTECHNOLOGY
LAW 221 (2004).
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